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“In war the first principle is to disobey orders. Any fool can
obey an order.”1
ABSTRACT
This Article not only questions whether an embodied artificial
intelligence (“EAI”) could give an order to a human combatant, but
controversially, examines whether it should also refuse one. A future EAI
may be capable of refusing to follow an order, for example, where an order
appeared to be manifestly unlawful, was otherwise in breach of
International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”), national Rules of
Engagement (“ROE”) or, even, where they appeared to be immoral or
unethical. Such an argument has traction in the strategic realm in terms
of “system of systems”—the premise that more advanced technology can
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1. Michael Symanski, Any Fool Can Obey an Order, MODERN WAR INST. (Mar. 17,
2017), https://mwi.usma.edu/fool-can-obey-order/ (“so wrote First Sea Lord Jacky
Fisher in angry Critique of Captain H.M. Pelly, a cruiser Captain under Admiral Beatty
at the battle of Dogger Bank in 1915”); see also Ryan Scott, Willful Disobedience: Character
traits of Independent Thinkers in the Military, MODERN WAR INST. (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://mwi.usma.edu/willful-disobedience-character-traits-independent-thinkersmilitary/ [https://perma.cc/9MBP-268G].
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potentially help overcome Clausewitzian “friction” or “fog of war.” An
aircraft’s anti-stall mechanism, which takes over, and corrects human
error, is seen as nothing less than “positive.”
As part of opening this much-needed discussion, the Authors
examine the legal parameters, and by way of a solution provide a
framework for overriding and disobeying. Central to this discussion, are
state specific ROEs within the concept of “duty to take precautions.” At
present, the guidelines relating to a human combatant’s right to disobey
orders are contained within such doctrine, but vary widely. For example,
in the United States, a soldier may disobey an order but only when the act
in question is clearly unlawful. In direct contrast, however, Germany’s
“state practice” requires orders to be compatible with the much wider
concept of human dignity, and to be of “use for service.”
By way of a solution, the Authors propose the crafting of a test
referred to as “robot rules of engagement” (“RROE”) with specific regard
to the disobeying of orders. These RROE ensure (via a multi-stage
verification process) that an EAI can discount human “traits” and
minimize errors that lead to breaches of IHL. In the broader sense, the
Authors question whether warfare should remain an utterly human
preserve—where human error is an unintended but unfortunate
consequence—or, whether the duty to take all feasible precautions in
attack in fact require a human commander to utilize available AI systems
to routinely question human decision-making, and where applicable,
prevent mistakes. In short, the Article examines whether human error can
be corrected and overridden, but for the better, rather than for the worse.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article goes significantly beyond traditional boundaries
of debate surrounding a combatant’s legal obligation to disobey
unlawful orders,2 and by way of overall solution, presents both a
legal and strategic “system of systems.” Grounded at the very
heart or “Schwerpunkt” (to use Clausewitz’s terminology)3 of
strategic thinking is the concept of “friction” within warfare.4
Friction, simply-put is more colloquially known as “the fog of
war”—the concept that within warfare, things will go wrong, and
mistakes will happen.5 In essence, the Clausewitzian concept of
2. Indeed, to date, the primary focus in this area has been upon the acceptability
(or not) of the “Nuremberg defense,” in respect of the commission of war crimes. See
James B. Insco, Defense of Superior Orders before Military Commissions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 389 (2003); Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law
of War, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 939 (1998); Robert E. Murdough, I Won’t Participate in an Illegal
War: Military Objectors, the Nuremberg Defense, and the Obligation to Refuse Illegal Orders, 2010
ARMY L. 4 (2010).
3. Clausewitz refers to “Schwerpunct” a number of times in the original German
language edition of his magnus opus, Vom Kreige (On War). The authoritative English
language edition of On War translates Schwerpunkt to mean “centers of gravity,” the
notion that in warfare one can identify a “hub of all power and movement, on which
everything depends . . . the point against which all . . . energies should be directed.” See
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 720 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds., 1976, rev. ed.
1984); see also COLIN S. GRAY, MODERN STRATEGY, 75-112 (1999); see, e.g., John E.
Tashjean, Pious Arms: Clausewitz and the Right of War, 44 MIL. AFF. 82, 83 (1980)
(providing general works on Clausewitz); see generally CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ,
CLAUSEWITZ ON STRATEGY: INSPIRATION AND INSIGHT FROM A MASTER STRATEGIST
(Christopher Bassford et al. eds., 2001).
4. CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR, supra note 3, at 138-40 (at page 138 Clausewitz notes that
“Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish
real war from war on paper.”).
5. Strategic literature is replete with examples. See, e.g., COLIN S. GRAY, AIRPOWER
FOR STRATEGIC EFFECT 214 (2012). Here, for example, the author discusses sorties being
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“friction,” is what distinguishes “real war” from war on paper,
something (despite advances of technology) for which a strategist
cannot always account.6 Strategic doctrines that failed to account
for “friction” were deemed as inherently flawed,7 and
considerable ink was spilt in the 1990s and 2000s to consider the
means by which to overcome friction in warfare.8 Fully-conscious
that previous efforts to simply “throw” advanced technology at
the problem would not resolve the issue,9 strategists formulated
the idea of “system of systems.”10 Much as with a mechanical
watch, technology/cogs would be assigned individual tasks, but
those smaller “cogs” would then form part of a bigger and more
advanced “system of systems.”11
As presented above, the Authors propose to transfer this
strategic concept into the legal realm as a means of providing an
overall solution. By doing so, they are able to consider how, and
more importantly when, various “individuals” within the chain of
command (e.g., human to Autonomous Weapon System (“AWS”); AWS
abandoned during the Kosovo conflict due to foggy conditions near the bases in Terano,
Italy; the negative impact of bad weather (in the form of rain) in Vietnam; and even how
relatively modern operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were negatively affected.
6. Id. at 44-45.
7. See, e.g., BARRY D. WATTS, THE FOUNDATIONS OF U.S. AIR DOCTRINE: THE
PROBLEM OF FRICTION IN WAR 47-54 (2012). Watts discusses the doctrine of Strategic Air
Power (“SAP”), a relatively simple notion that airpower alone is sufficient (in the military
sense) to bring about victory. According to Watts, SAP failed to live up to its promise due
to lack of “frictional” considerations. Despite technological advances, rain, fog, and the
climate as a whole prevented SAP from operating in certain instances.
8. Id. Furthermore, as noted and reinforced by Watts, failure to account for friction
prevents any strategic doctrine from fulfilling its potential. However, as with all doctrines,
there is not just one overriding factor (although the omission of “frictional
considerations”) is probably the most significant.
9. Id.
10. See GRAY, supra note 5, at 106.
11. In short, a system-of-systems is a collection of independent systems/elements
that are each allotted a specific task. They each complete this task without necessarily
having to consult other systems/ elements—in a vehicle, this could, for example, be
power steering. However, sometimes a group of such systems can be considered
holistically, with the result of the overarching system being much more advanced, and
capable, than any of the individual elements could be alone—a self-driving car, for
example, would need many individual components, perhaps including GPS, radar, lidar,
and other sensors, automatic braking, lane recognition, self-parking, cameras, and, not
least, a central processor. None of these systems alone, however, could ever ensure a
vehicle getting safely from A to B. See, e.g., Automated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC
SAFETY
ADMIN.
(NHSTA),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/technologyinnovation/automated-vehicles-safety [https://perma.cc/8PKB-GY7W] (last visited Feb.
18, 2021).
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to human; EAI to AWS, human to EAI) would be able to correctly
reject and overturn an erroneous and unlawful order.12
Throughout, the Authors argue that simply transposing a
combatant’s right and duty to disobey an unlawful order into the
EAI realm without further scrutiny is unwise, for it would close
the door on a much-needed discussion in terms of how EAIs
could potentially remove human error or “friction” in warfare.13
In terms of a unique and novel solution, the Authors
envisage
the
following:
the
EAI (when
considering any order) will not only run a continuous/dynamic
proportionality assessment (an implicit factor of which is a
perpetual target verification mechanism), but will also identify
whether the human decision is motivated by human character
“flaws” such as revenge or self-preservation. Where the EAI is
satisfied that the order is IHL compliant but that human error is
in evidence, the EAI should reject that human command. While
there is undoubtably a concern that EAIs might increase
“friction” (due to their behavior) the Authors counter such a
possibility by implementing the following: when it comes to a
human to EAI order in the chain of command the Authors
suggest several cogs and levels within this “system of systems” with
each one independently making a specific determination.
Consequently, each independent system would be tasked with
only one computation. This is set this out comprehensively, and
considered alongside a number of scenarios in Part IV. Here, the
Authors consider the system-of-systems in its most extreme
setting—“robot refusal” of nuclear launch.
An additional, but natural (and indeed desirable)
implication of this discussion is whether the threshold is raised—
the extra layers of “protection” proposed by the Authors imply
that IHL obligations are set much higher. One could readily
argue that an EAI’s calculations place it under a higher burden
in terms of assessment and accountability of information when
12. As the analysis that follows demonstrates, there is presently some deviation in
state practice with respect to exactly which orders a soldier should disobey.
13. Note robot refusal in this realm is a controversial discussion, not least because
some commentators hold that in order for a soldier to disobey an unlawful order (and
therefore to any machine equivalent) “they must exercise ‘agency’ and engage in
nuanced reasoning.” See Tetyana Krupiy, Unravelling Power Dynamics in Organizations: An
Accountability Framework for Crimes Triggered by Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, 15 LOY.
U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 1, 15 (2017).
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taking a particular decision. Ostensibly, the Authors’ analysis is
distilled into three distinct areas: first, the understanding and
scrutiny of existing guidelines regarding the duty to take
precautions: wide (United States); narrow (Germany). Second,
the way in which the guidelines are interpreted with regard to the
right to refusal: wide (Germany); narrow (United States). Finally,
the Authors propose a solution to the existing variations in
application by introducing an additional test. This provides a
method for determining precisely how an EAI may refuse
erroneous human command. The Authors believe this discussion
is necessary due to the fact that as long as there is human
involvement, there will always be human error.
While one could argue that there are more things that could
“go wrong” (due to technological limitations of 21st century
technology), to suggest that this will remain the status quo, is
dismissive of advances in machine learning.14 While the absolute
and complete removal of error is difficult to envisage, one could
analogize such a step with an anti-stall mechanism in an aircraft—
a simple and existing technology which innocuously overrides
human error for the “better.” 15 In other words, while the
Authors’ proposed “system of systems” regarding refusal may not

14. See George Anadiotis, The state of AI in 2019: Breakthroughs in machine learning,
natural language processing, games, and knowledge graphs, ZDNET (July 8, 2019),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/the-state-of-ai-in-2019-breakthroughs-in-machinelearning-natural-language-processing-games-and-knowledge-graphs/
[https://perma.cc/V82E-3AV9] (providing a useful and relaxed discussion about recent
breakthroughs in machine learning and possible future developmental trajectories).
15. A stall is defined as “a sudden reduction in the lift generated by an aerofoil
when the critical angle of attack is reached or exceeded.” Stall, SKYBRARY,
https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Stall
[https://perma.cc/NL3P-BAJF]
(last
visited Jan. 27, 2021). Anti-stall systems automatically reduce the pitch of the aircraft nose
where, for example, the angle of attack is exceeded due to pilot error. They are typically
considered so effective that they are a requirement on all transport aircrafts. Id. However,
the system is not a complete failsafe, and following a spate of incidents in 2019, a
malfunctioning anti-stall was responsible for grounding Boeing’s entire fleet of 737 Max
aircraft. See Gwyn Topham, Anti-stall system was ‘in play’ on Ethiopian’s Boeing 737 Max,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/25/antistall-system-was-in-play-on-ethiopians-boeing-737-max [https://perma.cc/9XA2-EKDD];
David Shepardson & Jamie Freed, FAA failed to properly review 737 MAX jet’s anti-stall system
(Oct.
11,
2019),
JATR
findings,
Business
News,
REUTERS
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-boeing-airplane-faa/faa-failed-to-properlyreview-737-max-jets-anti-stall-system-jatr-findings-idUKKBN1WQ0PS
[https://perma.cc/C9TQ-Y49E].
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fully eradicate “friction,” its negative effects will have been
significantly reduced and constrained.16
The heart of this Article is the proposition that future EAIs
will possess sufficient decision-making capabilities in order for
them to be considered, prima facie, “conscious.”17 By way of
overview, the Article is structured as follows: Part II of the Article
examines the way in which the Duty to Take Precautions operates
as a whole within the IHL realm. Specific focus is placed upon
state practice so as to make the necessary link between the Duty
to Take Precautions and the disobeying of orders. Part III
examines the specific interface between the legal obligations
contained in IHL, and their translation into state-based ROEs.
Part IV introduces the Authors’ “stress test,” and the logistics of
“robot refusal” in terms of providing a concrete legal test for
determining when an erroneous command (whatever its
designation: human, autonomous or EAI) should be rejected and
refused. Finally, Part V considers some of the wider implications
of EAI refusal, specifically with regard to robot spies and robot
private military contractors.
II. DUTY TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS DURING ARMED CONFLICT
Prevailing discussion within the existing scholarship
regarding AWS and EAI systems falling under the scope of IHL
has understandably centered on whether such systems can satisfy
the necessary distinction and proportionality requirements.18
16. Existing military systems including satellite and thermal imaging, 3D mapping,
and real-time battlefield updates received from various robots located in and around the
battlespace already operate at speeds far in excess of human capabilities. However, such
technologies will inevitably be surpassed, and overtaken in the not too distant future.
17. Indeed, the Authors acknowledge that this examination of robot refusal sits
alongside a much wider philosophical, ethical and legal debate regarding robot
sentience and the concept of robot refusal. Should a “sex”-robot, for example, be
entitled to say no, and, should there be consequences for it, and/or for the “client” who
chooses to ignore such an instruction? See Robert Sparrow, Robots, Rape, and
Representation, 9 INT. J. SOC. ROBOTICS 465, 465-77 (2017); Neda Atanasoski & Kalindi
Vora, Why the Sex Robot Becomes the Killer Robot – Reproduction, Care, and the Limits of Refusal,
SPHERES J. 1, 3 (2020); Lily Frank & Sven Nyholm, Robot sex and consent: Is consent to sex
between a robot and a human conceivable, possible, and desirable?, 25 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLEGENCE & L. 305, 305-23 (2017).
18. See, e.g., Neil Davidson, A legal perspective: Autonomous weapon systems under
international humanitarian law, in UNODA OCCASIONAL PAPERS NO. 30: PERSPECTIVES ON
LETHAL AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS 5, 7 (2017); Marco Sassoli, Autonomous Weapons
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Equally, the general corpus of literature regarding the duty to
take precautions during armed conflict is also relatively wellestablished.19 Consequently, the Authors navigate the key
contours of this landscape without over elaboration. Rather, the
purpose and focus of Part II is to identify how the duty to take
precautions (“DTP”) fits within the larger corpus of IHL. At its
core, the following section confirms the Authors’ firm assertation
that future commanders will have to use EAIs as part of their DTP,
and ultimately, to “respect” their decision not to follow orders.
A. How Does the Duty Take Precautions Fit Within IHL?
The purpose of this Section is twofold. First, the Authors
identify a combatant’s lawful obligation to take precautions in
attack that is contained within Article 57 of Additional Protocol I
(“API”).20 Secondly, the Authors demonstrate how the customary
duty to disobey a manifestly unlawful order is applicable to
increasingly autonomous technologies such as EAIs.
IHL strives to “achieve” the thankless task of reconciling two
fundamental values operating at opposing ends of a “spectrum.”21
These are: 1) the protection of civilian life and civilian objects;
and 2) the concept of military necessity.22 Considerable attention
and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues
to be Clarified, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 308, 338-40 (2014); Chantal Grut, The Challenge of
Autonomous Lethal Robotics to International Humanitarian Law, 18 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 5,
5 (2013); Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous weapon systems and international humanitarian
law: a reply to the critics, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 1, 8 (2013).
19. See, e.g., Thurnher J.S., Feasible Precautions in Attack and Autonomous Weapons, in
DEHUMANIZATION OF WARFARE (Heintschel von Heinegg et al. eds., 2018); see Michael
N. Schmitt, Precision attack and international humanitarian law, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
445 (2005); Geoffrey Corn & James A. Schoettler, Targeting and Civilian Risk Mitigation:
The Essential Role of Precautionary Measures, 223 MIL. L. REV. 785 (2015).
20. Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, International
Committee of the Red Cross, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter API].
21. The ICRC identifies that “International humanitarian law is a set of rules which
seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict.” See What is
International
Humanitarian
Law?,
ICRC,
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MQ5U-NVUL] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). However, while IHL
clearly does provide a number of obvious protections for both civilians and combatants,
the point is it does not prevent or outlaw war.
22. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”): “The
‘principle of military necessity’ permits measures which are actually necessary to
accomplish a legitimate military purpose and are not otherwise prohibited by
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has been dedicated to the “achievement” (or not) of this
precarious balance, and the Authors do not seek to further that
particular discussion.23 Nevertheless, the legal barometers of
distinction and proportionality act as safeguards to ensure that
reconciliation between the two fundamental values takes place in
practice. The first of these two principles is captured by Article 48
API which provides the “basic rule.”24 This ensures that civilians—
and civilian objects—are distinguished from military objectives.
“Distinction” is clearly intended to reflect the protectionist ambit
of the IHL balancing act. Once the distinction has been made,
Article 51 (2) API ensures that civilians and civilian objects must
not be made the object of a direct attack,25 while also prohibiting
threats of violence where their use is intended to spread terror.26
Article 57 API refers specifically to precautions in attack.
Article 57(1) states, “[i]n the conduct of military operations,
constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population,

international humanitarian law. In the case of an armed conflict the only legitimate
military purpose is to weaken the military capacity of the other parties to the conflict.”
Military
Necessity,
ICRC,
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/military-necessity
[https://perma.cc/89DZ-J3CQ] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
23. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 8-12 (3d ed. 2016) (the author identifies the need to
balance these two “driving forces” of IHL); Nobuo Hayashi, Requirements of Military
Necessity in International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law, 28 B.U. INT’L
L.J. 39, 41 (2010); see generally Yishai Beer, Humanity Considerations Cannot Reduce War’s
Hazards Alone: Revitalizing the Concept of Military Necessity, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 801, 801
(2015).
24. API, supra note 20, art. 48, at 36 (“In order to ensure respect for and protection
of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.”).
25. Id. art. 52, at 38. See also id. art. 49, at 36 (“‘Attacks’ means acts of violence
against an adversary, whether in offence or defence.”).
26. The full text Article 51 (2) API reads: “The civilian population as such, as well
as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are
prohibited.” Id. art. 51(2). Note also that Article 51(3) API states: “Civilians shall enjoy
the protection offered by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part
in hostilities” (“DPH”). Id. art. 51(3), at 37. Exactly which actions should qualify as
playing a DPH is the subject of some conjecture. For an in-depth analysis of the two
leading schools of thought, see Francis Grimal & Michael J. Pollard, “Embodied AI” and
The Direct Participation in Hostilities, 51 GEO. J. INT’L L. 513 (2020) (the Authors’ previous
piece discussing EAIs and DPH).
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civilians and civilian objects.”27 And, Article 57(2) provides
further detail supplying that:
. . . a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall: (i) do
everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked
are neither civilians nor civilian objects . . . [and] . . . (ii) take
all feasible precautions in the choice of means and method
of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing,
incidental loss of life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian
objects.28

Although it is not referred to explicitly. the principle of
proportionality is contained within Article 57(2)(a)(iii) API. This
ensures that a combatant must refrain from launching an attack
where the damage caused to civilians or civilian objects “would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.”29 This provision acknowledges the concept of
military necessity and, in doing so, that “situations may arise
where civilians simply cannot be spared.”30 Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of
the Rome Statute identifies that carrying out a disproportionate
attack is a war crime.31 According to the International Committee
of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), proportionality is customary in

27. API, supra note 20, art. 57(1), at 41 (This is known as the “constant care”
obligation, to which more attention is given in the discussion which follows.).
28. API, supra note 20, art. 57(2)(a)(i)-(ii).
29. Though note this provision does not refer to proportionality directly.
Nevertheless, as the ICJ identified in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) (Higgins, J., dissenting) [hereinafter
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion], API ensures that, “a legitimate target may not be
attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific
military gain . . . .” See also DINSTEIN, supra, note 23, at 152, 158 (noting that “military
advantage and civilian casualties/damage are incomparable in a quantifiable manner . . .
[and that] . . . [t]here is little prospect of agreement between opposing Belligerent
Parties as to the rival values of . . . [these concepts].”).
30. DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 164 (citing FRITS KALSHOVEN, REFLECTIONS ON THE
LAW OF WAR: COLLECTED ESSAYS 346, 546 (2007)).
31. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)
states: “For the purpose of this statute, ‘war crimes’ means: Intentionally launching an
attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct overall military advantage anticipated.”
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nature,32 as is the separate duty to take precautions in attack.33
These obligations are therefore placed upon all states regardless
of whether or not they are party to API—which enables due
consideration of US practice.34
Article 35(1) API is relevant to DTP, stating, “ . . . the right
of the Parties to choose methods or means or warfare is not
unlimited.”35 Here, the term “means” refers to the choice of
weapon—obligating the attacker to select “weapons and
munitions,” that prevent “‘overkill.’”36 “[M]ethods” of attack
include, “angles of attack,” “time on target,” and “similar tactical
choices.”37 If an attacker has a choice of means and method to
achieve a legitimate military objective, they “should” choose the
one that “is likely to cause the least collateral damage or
incidental injury.”38
32. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOL.
I: RULES (2005) [hereinafter ICRC Customary Rules] (ICRC Customary Rule 14, states:
“[l]aunching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is
prohibited . . . State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international
law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.”).
33. See id. (“[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to
spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must
be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects . . . State practice establishes this rule as a norm
of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international
armed conflicts.”
34. The United States is not currently a party to API.
35. See Regulation 22 annexed to the Hague Convention on Laws and Customs of
War on Land (IV), Oct. 18, 1907 (“The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring
the enemy is not unlimited”); Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 29, at 10-11
(identifying that nations “do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means of
weapons.”); see generally DINSTEIN, supra note 23; see generally STUART CASEY-MASLEN &
STEVEN HAINES, HAGUE LAW INTERPRETED: THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2018) (the authors, for example, argue that the ICJ
“strangely,” and incorrectly, limited the principle to weapons that caused unnecessary
suffering to combatants).
36. See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 164.
37. See id.
38. Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21 Century Warfare, 2 YALE
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 152 (1999); see ICRC Customary Rules, supra note 32 (ICRC
Customary Rule 17 restates art. 57 (2)(a)(ii): “Each party to the conflict must take all
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of warfare with a view to
avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians
and damage to civilian objects.”).
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This final statement is central to the discussion relating to the
concept of robot refusal. And, it is the cord that binds the present
discussion with that in Part III. As the Authors have argued
elsewhere, the introduction of increasingly advanced AI
technology into warfare is inevitable.39 For example, an EAI could
be an advanced theatre ballistic missile that was capable of
conducting an additional distinction and proportionality
assessment before striking its target. If the “on-board” tech
identified, for example, that the intended target was positioned
next to a hospital, it could choose to withdraw or self-destruct
before carrying out the attack. However, an EAI might equally be
an unarmed reconnaissance platform, or even a (unarmed)
humanoid member of a special ops group (for the sake of the
present article an EAI is distinguished from an AWS by way of the
fact that while an EAI can refuse to follow an order to apply force,
an AWS (once activated) can make targeting decisions and chose
to apply force independently of human supervision and/or
instruction). Regardless, such EAI systems will be capable of
monitoring live feeds of battlefield conditions outside of the
immediate area, and as a result, determine the “relative” value of
a target.40 These systems would then direct human decisionmakers accordingly. Furthermore, an EAI, or AI software could
be utilized in command and control to support high-end
operational decision-making regarding the deployment and
movement of strategic assets. Systems such as this may encourage
decision-making that changes the very operational fabric of an
armed conflict.
No matter which type of AI is at the operator’s disposal,
however, (leaving aside the matter of whether it offers an
improvement in the means or methods of warfare), there will be
occasions where a decision-maker must utilize it. To not do so, and
to instead use an alternative means that causes greater civilian
harms, would breach the DTP obligation.41 This is a natural

39. See Grimal & Pollard, supra note 26, at 520.
40. See generally Sassoli, supra note 18, at 339.
41. It is important to note that an attacker does not have to use a particular weapon,
or tactic, just because it will lessen the amount of collateral damage. A commander who
is in possession of a limited number of platforms, may for example, decide that there
would be more efficiently deployed elsewhere, or, with only a limited number of
munitions, decide that it would be more effective not to use one in the present
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continuation of the well-versed discussion of Schmitt and
Widmar, who note the loitering capabilities of UAVs’ (unmanned
aerial vehicles) significantly enhance target verification.42 Central
to the current discussion, is the postulation that where tech is
capable of conducting additional distinction or proportionality
assessments, it must also be capable of saying “no.” This is
analogous to existing operations whereby the tactical team on the
ground can see that the actual circumstances are manifestly
different to those that were imagined when the attack was
ordered.43
In all scenarios the decision regarding the most appropriate
means and methods are framed by the concept of “feasibility.”
This means, in planning an attack, a combatant must (as a
minimum) do only what is “feasible” to verify civilians or civilian
objects (hereinafter “feasible varication”), and that a means or
method should avoid, or at least minimize, collateral damage
(hereinafter “feasible precautions”). This means the tactical team
may decide to consummate the attack because of a high target
value. Though equally, command and control may choose to
extract the team and authorize the use of an over-the-horizon
precision strike instead. What is feasible in the circumstances
however, is inherently contextual.44 Moreover, the term “feasible”
is itself subject to various interpretations. Notably, there is no
supplementary clarification or definition of the term within
either API, the wider Geneva Conventions, or the Additional
Protocols.45 Instead, one must look to an alternate treaty to locate
circumstances. See Michael N. Schmitt & Eric W. Widmar, “On Target”: Precision and
Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting, 7 NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 379, 400-04 (2014).
42. See id. at 401.
43. But see id. at 401 (noting that sometimes a tactical situation can change after a
targeting decision has been made, but beyond the point at which an attack can be called
off.).
44. Corn & Schoettler, supra note 19, at 802; see, e.g., Schmitt & Widmar, supra note
41.
45. See, e.g., Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention (III)
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention IV]; Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
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a codified definition.46 A regularly cited example of this can be
found in Article 3(10) of the Protocol II Annexed to the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (“CCCW”), which
states:
[f]easible precautions are those precautions which are
practicable or practically possible taking into account all
circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian
and military considerations.47

This is, therefore, generally understood to be the standard
by which feasibility is assessed.48 And, clearly, it acknowledges the
delicate balance between the need to protect the civilian
population and the concept of military necessity.49 Two authors
note that the ICRC identifies that “practicable or practically
possible entails ‘common sense and good faith,’”50 and that the
feasibility standard is based upon the concept of
“reasonableness.”51 The brief examination that follows crossreferences a number of statements or codifications of feasibility
within past or present military doctrines in order to identify if they
offer something more tangible. Previously, US doctrine has stated

and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol (II) Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional
Protocol II]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), Dec. 8,
2005, T.I.A.S. No. 07–908 [hereinafter Additional Protocol III].
46. See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 165; Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 41, at 400
(directing the reader’s attention to art. 3(4) CCCW); see generally ICRC Customary Rules,
supra note 32; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125, U.N.T.S. 3, UK Reservation; see, e.g., Article 3(10) of Amended Protocol on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Mines, Booby Traps, and other Devices, May 3,
1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter Amended CCW Protocol II]; ICRC Customary Rules,
supra note 32, Customary Rule 15.
47. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices art. 3, Oct. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1523 [hereinafter CCCW].
48. Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 41, at 400.
49. Id. at 402 (“attackers need only select a less harmful means or methods that do
not involve sacrificing military advantage and that are feasible.”).
50. Id. at 400; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 681 (Yves
Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
51. Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 41, at 400-01.
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that its position reflects Article 3(10) CCCW.52 Arguably, however,
the this places greater emphasis upon military operations than it
does humanitarian concerns, as it removes any reference to the
latter.53 UK, German, Australian and Canadian doctrine reflects
Article 3(10) CCCW more precisely—the text appearing in the
manuals of each being virtually identical.54 Similarly, though
perhaps more liberally, French doctrine notes feasibility is “that
which can be realized or which is possible in practice, taking into
account all circumstances ruling at the time, including
humanitarian and military considerations.”55
There is slight variation between these alternative
interpretations, though each example does merely refer in some
way to “what is possible” in the circumstances. And, given the
52. See IV OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE
REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE
IN ARMED CONFLICTS GENEVA (1974-1977) 241 (1977); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 361 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts et al. eds.,
2005) [hereinafter ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules]. The United States
referred to “that which is practicable or practically possible, taking into account all
circumstances at the time, including those relevant to the success of military operations,”
rather than mirroring art. 3(4) where the final sentence reads: “including humanitarian
and military considerations.” Id. This was very similar to the German stance before the
ratification of API. See IV OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE
REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE
IN ARMED CONFLICTS GENEVA (1974-1977) 226 (1977) (stating that for the sake of Art. 57
API, feasible should mean: what “is practicable or practically possible, taking into
account all circumstances at the time, including those relevant to the success of military
operations.”).
53. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
54. For the United Kingdom doctrine, see United Kingdom, Declarations and
Reservations Made upon Ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 28 Jan. 1998, § b
(UK); for the German doctrine, see Germany, Declarations made upon Ratification of
the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 14 Feb. 1991, § 2 (Ger.); for the Australian doctrine, see
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 3 (Defence Publ’g Serv., 2006) (the glossary states that feasible
precautions are those “which are practicable or practically possible taking into account
all circumstances ruling at the time including humanitarian and military
considerations”); for the Canada doctrine, see Canada, Reservations Made upon
Ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 20 Nov. 1990 (Can.); see also CHIEF OF THE
DEFENCE STAFF, USE OF FORCE FOR CF OPERATIONS §112.6 (2008) (“‘Feasible’ is
understood as that which is practicable or practicably possible, taking into account all
circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.”).
See also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Practice Relating to Rule 15: The Principle of
Precautions in Attack, ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE (2005), https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule15#top
[https://perma.cc/43ZW-77MP] [hereinafter ICRC Database Rule 15].
55. ICRC Database Rule 15, supra note 54 (citing Reservations and declarations
made upon ratification of the of the 1977 Additional Protocol, §3 (2003)).
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inherently contextual nature of warfare, it is perhaps
unsurprising that these examples do little to add much in the way
of extrinsic context. Consequently, when this brief examination
is considered in isolation, any difference in interpretation is
arguably only a matter of semantics.
In summary, this Section has demonstrated that DTP is
intertwined with the IHL principles of distinction and
proportionality. DTP therefore, plays a pivotal role in
maintaining the critical balance between the protection of the
civilian population and the concept of military necessity. There
is, perhaps, a slight variation in state interpretation of the concept
of feasibility. Nevertheless, in order to adhere with DTP
obligations, there will undoubtably be instances in the future
where—in order to ensure that everything practicably possible
has been done to verify a target, or to minimize collateral
damage—a commander will have to utilize an EAI/ AWS.56
B. State Practice
With reference to the six military powers that were
considered in the previous Section,57 the following discussion
underlines state practice (with specific regard to the
interpretation of the duty to take precautions within IHL) that
goes beyond the concept of “feasibility.” N.B. The Authors do not
envisage consideration of “state practice” in terms of the
formation process of a customary international rule58 though of
course, one could suggest that if there is a suitable variance
56. A question that may be raised here is whether a commander may discharge
his/her duty by deploying a weapon which is independently capable of doing everything
“feasible” in terms of making real-time CDEM assessments. In other words, could
deploying an EAI lessen the burden upon the human commander? A full investigation
is beyond the scope of the current discussion; however, due to the fluidity of armed
conflict, the “fog” and/or unpredictability of war, this is perhaps unlikely.
57. For the sake of this Article, leading nations are considered to be those that have
a (global firepower) power index that ranks them number twenty-five or above. See 2020
FIRE
POWER
(2020),
Military
Strength
Ranking,
GLOBAL
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp
[https://perma.cc/5AGF225D]; see also Ellen Ioanes, This is How the US and Iran Rank Among the World’s 25 Most
INSIDER
(Jan.
7,
2020,
4:48
PM),
Powerful
Militaries,
BUS.
https://www.businessinsider.com/most-powerful-militaries-in-the-world-ranked-20199?r=US&IR=T [https://perma.cc/5ANP-85YC].
58. For a useful discussion regarding the state practice and opinion juris, the
elements that need to be satisfied in this sense, see DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 16-17.
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present between states it may undermine the idea that there is
overall consistency in this respect.59 The following examination is
conducted with a considerable focus upon Article 57 API.
Ultimately, however, it is during the processes of “feasible
verification” and “feasible precaution” as per Article 57(2)(a)(i)
and Article 57(2)(a)(ii) API respectively60 that the Authors wish
to ground their discussion in terms of rejecting an order.
In the first instance, the doctrine of all six states references
the wider “constant care” obligation. While in the majority of
cases the language utilized broadly reflects Article 57 (1),61 one
US Naval manual, once again, refers specifically to the concept of
“reasonableness.”62 Arguably, “all reasonable precautions”
implies a lesser obligation than that of say, Germany, whose
manuals identify “all necessary precautions.” A similar
discrepancy appears with regard to feasible verification.63 Here, a
59. DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 16-17.
60. API, supra note 20, art. 57(2)(a)(i)-(ii).
61. See generally ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 33738 (citing AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, MANUAL ON LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT,
OPERATION SERIES, ADFT 37 – INTERIM EDITION § 556 (1994) (Australia’s Defence Force
Manual states: “[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to
spare the civilian population and civilian objects to the maximum extent possible.”));
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL
AND TACTICAL LEVELS §15 (1999) (“civilians are entitled to protection from the dangers
arising from military operations. In conducting operations care should always be taken
to spare civilians and civilian objects.”); DIRECTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 98 (2000) (“In the conduct of military
operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and
civilian objects.”); GERMAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS MANUAL § 404 (“The civilian population as such as well as individual
civilians . . . shall be spared as far as possible.”); see also ICRC Database Rule 15, supra
note 54 (citing CTR. FOR INNER LEADERSHIP, HUMANITARIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
ARMED CONFLICTS – PRINCIPLES 4 (2006) (“When attacking a military objective, all
necessary precautions shall be taken to spare as far as possible the civilian population
located in the area or in the immediate vicinity of the object.”)); MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 5.23 (2004) (“In the
conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian
population, civilians and civilian objects.”).
62. ICRC Database Rule 15, supra note 54 (citing DEP’T OF THE NAVY ET AL., THE
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 8.1 (2007) (“[t]he law
of targeting, therefore, requires that all reasonable precautions must be taken to ensure
that only military objectives are targeted so that noncombatants, civilians, and civilian
objects are spared as much as possible from the ravages of war.”)).
63. See ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 367-70
(“[e]ach party to the conflict must do everything feasible to verify that targets are military
objectives . . . [and that] . . . state practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary

688 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:3

German commander is required to positively verify every target, 64
where in contrast US doctrine, once again requires reasonable
precautions to be taken.65 UK doctrine states a decision-maker
can only be expected to do everything feasible.66 As do
Australian,67 and Canadian doctrines.68 French doctrine,
however, mirrors the German requirement to “verify that the
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian
objects.”69 In practice, it may prove difficult to identify the
existence of a large disparity between what might be considered
reasonable, and what is considered necessary. However, on paper
at least, “individual” practice with regard to target verification can
be established. As a result, while French and German armed
forces may be “required” to deploy future EAIs as often as is
possible, the United States is likely to give their decision-makers
more maneuverability when faced with the option.
The obligation to avoid, or at least minimize incidental
damage (ICRC Rule 15) represents one of two elements of the
international law applicable in both international and non-international armed
conflicts.”).
64. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Practice Relating to Rule 16: Targeting
CUSTOMARY
IHL
DATABASE
(2005),
https://ihlVerification,
ICRC
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule15#top
[https://perma.cc/63NC-LGGZ] [hereinafter ICRC Database Rule 16]; GERMAN
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS MANUAL § 457
(“Before engaging an objective, every responsible military leader shall verify the military
nature of the objective to be attacked.”).
65. See DEP’T OF THE NAVY ET AL., THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS § 8.1 (2007).
66. Id.; MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT § 13.32 (2004) (“(a) those who plan, decide upon or execute an attack must
take all feasible measures to gather information which will assist in determining whether
or not objects which are not military objectives are present in an area of attack, (b) in
the light of the information available to them, those who plan, decide upon or execute
an attack shall do everything feasible to ensure that attacks are limited to military
objectives.”).
67. AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE DOCTRINE PUBL’N 06.4: LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 5.61
(2006),
https://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/documents/doctrinelibrary/addp/addp06.4lawofarmedconflict.pdf [https://perma.cc/XY8L-4DFJ].
68. Id.; CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF, USE OF FORCE FOR CF OPERATIONS § 112.2
(2008) (“All feasible precautions must be taken to verify that the target is a military
objective, and not a civilian or a civilian object, and that it is not subject to any of the
specialized regimes of protection which prohibit, or severely restrict, attacks on certain
persons and objects.”).
69. DIRECTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MANUAL OF ARMED CONFLICT 98
(2001).
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concept of feasible precautions.70 As noted, the other refers to the
means and method of attack (ICRC Rule 17).71 Given that the
United States is not a party to API, these “customary” rules are
also considered individually for the sake of the following
examination. With regards to Rule 15, US,72 and Australian
doctrines refer, once again, to the concept of reasonableness.73
This is repeated by Canadian doctrine,74 though further guidance
also states military operations should be “conducted in such a way
that damage to civilians and their property is minimized . . .
[and] . . . only the necessary force that causes the least amount of
collateral civilian damage” is used.75 French Doctrine requires
“all precautions,”76 while German returns to the concept of “all
feasible precautions.”77 Finally, UK guidance states that
“[p]recautions must be taken . . . to avoid civilian death or injury
and damage to civilian objects”,78 and perhaps a little more
ambiguously, “[c]are must be taken . . . .”79
70. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Rule 15. Principle of Precautions on Attack, ICRC
CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE (2005), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule15 [https://perma.cc/3LG6-FZ9M] [hereinafter ICRC Rule
15].
71. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Rule 17. Choice of Means and Methods of Warfare,
ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE (2005), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule17 [https://perma.cc/E7H4-379T] [hereinafter ICRC Rule
17].
72. ICRC Database Rule 15, supra note 54 (citing DEP’T OF THE NAVY ET AL., THE
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 8.3.1(2007))
(“commanders must take all reasonable precautions, taking into account military and
humanitarian considerations, to keep civilian casualties and damage to the minimum
consistent with mission accomplishment . . . .”).
73. AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE DOCTRINE PUBL’N 06.4: LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 5.53
(2006) (“all reasonable precautions must be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage to
civilians and civilian objects and locations. It is therefore important to obtain accurate
intelligence before mounting an attack.”).
74. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 345; see also OFFICE
OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND
TACTICAL LEVELS §711.3 (2001).
75. ICRC Database Rule 15, supra note 54 (citing § 4, Rule 2 of Canada’s Code of
Conduct (2005)); see also Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, § 4, Rule 2 (Can.).
76. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 346 (citing
DIRECTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LOAC TEACHING NOTE 2 (2000)).
77. Id. (citing GERMAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS MANUAL § 510).
78. ICRC Database Rule 15, supra note 54 (citing MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., THE
JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 317, § 12.26 (2004)).
79. ICRC Database Rule 15, supra note 54 (citing MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT, D/DAT/13/35/66, ARMY CODE 71130 § 4(b) (1981)).
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Consequently, although “feasibility” is a central focus of the
six states’ national doctrines, each arguably exhibits a small
degree of divergence in terms of interpretation of Rule 15.
Moreover, with regard to Rule 17, Australian doctrine80 identifies
that while military decision-makers must do everything feasible to
ensure collateral damage is minimized, “the existence of
precision guided weapons munitions . . . does not mean they must
necessarily be used.”81 This is a stance that is reflected by US
doctrine, which states:
The commander must decide, in light of all the facts
known or reasonably available to him, including the
need to conserve resources and complete the mission
successfully, whether to adopt an alternative method of
attack, if reasonably available, to reduce civilian
casualties and damage Under the heading of
“proportionality.”82

Canadian doctrine refers back to Article 57(2),83 and
similarly, a French manual states that decision-makers shall “take
all precautions which are practically possible in the choice of
means and methods of attack . . . .”84 German doctrine is,
however, more stringent requiring that “before engaging an
objective, every responsible military leader shall . . . choose means
and methods minimizing incidental injury and damage to civilian
life and objects.”85 Prima facie, this narrow obligation is also a
80. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Practice Relating to Rule 17. Choice of Means and
Methods of Warfare, ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE (2005), https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule17 [https://perma.cc/P88W65ZN] [hereinafter ICRC Database Rule 17] (citing AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE,
MANUAL ON LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, OPERATION SERIES, ADFT 37 – INTERIM EDITION
§ 556(e) (1994)).
81. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 376 (citing
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, MANUAL ON LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, OPERATION SERIES,
ADFT 37 – INTERIM EDITION § 834 (1994)).
82. ICRC Database Rule 17, supra note 80 (DEP’T OF THE NAVY ET AL., THE
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 8.3.1(2007)).
83. ICRC Database Rule 17, supra note 80 (citing CANADIAN FORCES JOINT PUBL’N,
USE OF FORCE FOR CF OPERATIONS § 112.4 (2008) (“[a]l feasible precautions must be
taken in the choice of means and methods of attack to avoid, and in any event to
minimize, incidental civilian loss and damage (i.e., collateral damage.”)).
84. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 377 (citing
DIRECTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MANUAL OF ARMED CONFLICT 2 § 5.2 (2001)).
85. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 377 (citing
GERMAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS
MANUAL § 457).
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requirement of UK armed forces.86 However, the UK Manual
states this is only where feasible.87 With the Part II analysis nearing
completion, three primary interpretive tracks have come to the
fore; (i) the narrow interpretation, (ii) the treaty-based
interpretation, and (iii) the wide interpretation. These are
represented as follows:

86. See MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 82 §5.32.4 (2004) (“There is the obligation to select the means (that is,
weapons) or methods of attack (that is, tactics) which will cause the least incidental
damage commensurate with military success.”).
87. See MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 83 (2004).

692 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Obligation to take
Constant Care

US
“ . . . take all reasonable
precautions . . .”

Wide
Interpretation

Feasible Verification
(ICRC Rule 16)

US
“ . . . ensure reasonable
precautions are
taken . . .”
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Feasible Precautions
(A):
Minimize Civilian
Harms (ICRC Rule
15)
US
“ . . . where
reasonable . . .”

Aus.
“ . . . where
reasonable . . .”
Can.
“ . . . where
reasonable . . .”
Central/Treaty
Based Approach

Aus.
“ . . . maximum extent
possible . . .”
Can.
“ . . . care should always be
taken . . .”
UK
“ . . . constant care shall be
taken . . .”

Aus.
“ . . . feasible
precautions . . .”
Can.
“ . . . feasible
precautions (as per Art.
3(4) CCCW) . . .”
UK
“ . . . feasible
precautions (as per Art.
3(4) CCCW) . . .”

Feasible
Precautions (B):
Choice of Means
and Methods (ICRC
Rule 17)
US
“ . . . conservation of
resources . . . [and]
. . . reasonable
availability . . .”
Aus.
“ . . . consider wider
mission objectives . . .”

Can.
“ . . . all feasible
precautions . . .”
UK
“ . . . where feasible (as
per Art. 3(4) CCCW)
. . .”

Fra.
“ . . . constant care shall be
taken . . .”

UK
“ . . . least collateral
damage commensurate
with military
success . . .”
Fra.
“ . . . all precautions
which are practically
possible . . .”

Ger.
“ . . . where feasible (as
per Art. 3(4) CCCW)
. . .”

Narrow
Interpretation
Ger.
“ . . . all necessary
precautions (to spare as far as
possible) . . .”

Fra.
“ . . . Must verify objects
to be attacked . . .”
Ger.
“ . . . shall verify the
military status of
target . . .”

Fra.
“ . . . take all
precautions . . .”
Ger.
“ . . . shall choose
means and methods to
minimize civilian
harms . . .”

Figure 1. The IHL Duty to Take Precautions in Attack: State Practice.
Figure 1 identifies that while the language used in national
doctrine is comparable, some states nevertheless appear to place
a greater burden upon their troops to ensure DTP compliance.

2021]

SHOULD ROBOTS REFUSE?

693

And, once the doctrine which largely repeats the text of the treaty
is removed, this practice can be distilled one step further—
presented as follows:
State Practice/
Interpretation
Wide

Narrow

Measures taken to
ensure target
verification . . . ;
Must be reasonable
in the
circumstances.

All precautions to
minimize civilian
harms where . . . ;
Reasonable

Use Means or
Method . . . ;
Where it is reasonable
to do so, [and in
particular where it is
consistent with the concepts
of resource conservation, or
reasonable availability].
Whenever/ wherever
possible.

Must be all available
Feasible
measures in all
circumstances.
Figure 2. The Narrow and Wide interpretations of the Duty to Take
Precautions

To summarize, DTP is irrevocably intertwined with
distinction and proportionality. Together, the three concepts
help maintain the delicate balance between humanitarian
considerations and military necessity. The discussion in Part II has
centered specifically upon “feasible verification,” and “feasible
precautions.” To this, one may also add the obligation for the
targeteer to take constant care, though this also remains subject
to feasibility.88 Having considered a small sample of state practice,
the analysis has identified that certain states appear to sway
towards the military necessity extreme of the IHL spectrum as
compared to others. This is perhaps most noticeable when
comparing US practice to that of Germany—for example, a
German soldier must assess each target before choosing the
means and method that will minimize civilian harm. The US
targeteer is actively encouraged to consider the wider mission
brief. However, regardless of such variations, it is undeniable that
there will be circumstances where those that possess EAI and AWS
technology will be legally obligated to use them. A key question

88. See Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 41, at 400-01.
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that is posed by the current thesis, and one which the following
section addresses, is what are the conditions under which an EAI
should refuse an order?
III. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND DISOBEYING OF ORDERS
The discussion in Part II identified that the DTP obligation
can be subdivided into numerous interconnected paths.89 The
analysis concluded that while a narrow and wide interpretation of
“feasibility” can be crafted, neither path detracts from the
certainty that where EAIs are a feasible option, armed-forces will
be obligated to deploy them. The purpose of Part III is to
forensically examine the interface between DTP and the statebased Rules of Engagement (“ROE”).90 Here, specific reference
is naturally centered on the disobeying of orders. This
examination is necessary because if nations are to be required to
utilize EAIs, a key question arises as to whether robots can, and
should, refuse an order to attack? Similar to the Part II
examination, Part III first identifies how the obligation to disobey
orders fits within the corpus of IHL, and in particular within
DTP.91 This is followed, once again, with an examination of state
practice in this area.
A. How does the Duty to Disobey an Order fit within DTP?
No matter whether AWS as a “means” are realized, unarmed
AI/EAIs will become a “method” utilized by armed-forces. The
introduction of increasingly autonomous tech can be seen

89. Indeed, the art. 57 obligations extend further than is considered for the current
analysis. This includes, for example, a duty to provide an advance warning of an attack,
where possible [i.e. where feasible] and, to choose the target that leads to lesser civilian
harms when presented with two or more targets that offer a similar military advantage.
See API, supra note 20, art. 57 (2)(c)-(3).
90. For the sake of the present article, the terms “ROE” and “military doctrine” are
used interchangeably. The DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, for
example states: “ROE [are] directives issued by competent military authority that
delineate the circumstances and limitation under which US forces will initiate and/or
continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (“Doctrine” is
undefined).” See DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, DEP’T DEFENSE (June
2020),
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=202006-18-073638-727 [https://perma.cc/D9BZ-WXRD].
91. How DTP fits within the wider body of IHL has already been examined.
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throughout industry, and there is no reason to suspect the
military domain will be any different. For example, a human may
program an autonomous car with a destination address, but the
vehicles’ software is responsible for making decisions about which
turn to either make, or not.92 In the military domain however, the
task will not always be as straightforward as getting from “A” to
“B.” But, where deployed, an EAI may have to refuse to order to
ensure a positive military advantage is balanced with
humanitarian considerations—but in which circumstances?
This Section identifies the concept of manifestly unlawful
orders and the customary duty to disobey one. This duty itself
must be viewed alongside the fact that a combatant also has a duty
to follow orders. Indeed, as noted by one commentator,93 from
1863, Article 44 of Lieber code permitted a commanding officer
to shoot and kill a subordinate on the spot, should they disobey
their order to cease committing a crime.94 Today’s soldier may
not face quite the same fate. However, they may still be subject to
court martial or imprisonment.95 As a consequence, in the vast
majority of circumstances (while seemingly at odds with the ICJ’s
rejection of the “Nuremberg defense”),96 a combatant may rely

92. See PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE 31-32 (W. W. Norton & Co. eds., 1st ed. 2018)
(identifying the automatic/automated/autonomous spectrum, the author notes: “[a]s
machines become more sophisticated, they become more capable and able to
accomplish more complex tasks in more open-ended environments.”).
93. Gurgen Petrosian, Elements of Superior Responsibility for sexual violence by
subordinates, 42 MAN. L.J.123, 127 (2019).
94. General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field art. 44 (Apr. 24, 1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code] (“a soldier,
officer or private, in the act of committing such violence, and disobeying a superior
ordering him to abstain from it, may be lawfully killed on the spot by such superior.”).
95. See, e.g., Armed Forces Act, (2006), art. 12(1) (UK) (“A person subject to service
law commits an offence if— (a) he disobeys a lawful command; and (b) he intends to
disobey, or is reckless as to whether he disobeys, the command. (2) A person guilty of an
offence under this section is liable to any punishment mentioned in the Table in section
164, but any sentence of imprisonment imposed in respect of the offence must not
exceed ten years.”).
96. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis (“London
Agreement”) Aug. 8, 1945, 59. Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (“The fact that the defendant
acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal
determines that justice so requires.”).
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upon the defense that they were acting in accordance with
orders.97
The majority of domestic courts recognize one of three
variations of this defense: (i) that following orders is always a
defense; (ii) that following orders is a defense where the
combatant believed it was a lawful order, and; (iii) that following
orders is a defense where it would have been reasonable to believe
that the order was lawful.98 The United States adheres to the latter
of these three variants, with the passage previously identified
continuing, “ . . . unless the accused knew the orders to be
unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and understanding would
have known the orders to be unlawful.”99 According to the second
and third variants of the “following orders” defense therefore,
there are circumstances where a soldier either “will” recognize an
unlawful order, or where they “should” have recognized an
unlawful order. And this is a customary duty, thus binding upon
all parties.100 Significantly, this not only means that there are
limited circumstances under which a combatant can refuse to
follow an order, but, that in such circumstances “[e]very
combatant has a duty to disobey a manifestly unlawful order.”101
Indeed, where the combatant does not fulfil this latter duty, but
instead carries out a manifestly unlawful order, no “Nuremberg
defense” can be relied upon, and the subordinate will face
individual criminal responsibility. This is considered an
additional customary provision.102
“Manifestly unlawful,” or “manifestly criminal,” generally
refers to war crimes. This includes breaches of the IHL principles
of distinction and proportionality.103 In addition, crimes against
97. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, §916(d) (2016)
[hereinafter US Courts-Martial Manual] (“It is a defense to any offense that the accused
was acting pursuant to orders . . .”); see also Keith A. Petty, Duty and Disobedience: The
Conflict of Conscience and Compliance in the Trump Era, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 55, 103-04 (2018)
(citing Osiel, supra note 2, at 21 (“Virtually all military codes include some provision on
due obedience . . . .”)).
98. See Osiel, supra note 2, at 950; see also Petty, supra note 97, at 103-04.
99. US Courts-Martial Manual, supra note 97, II-116.
100. See ICRC Customary Rules, supra note 32, at 563-64.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 565 (“Obeying a superior order does not relieve a subordinate of
criminal responsibility if the subordinate knew that the act ordered was unlawful or
should have known because of the manifestly unlawful nature of the act ordered.”).
103. The legal basis of which was considered in Section II.A supra.
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humanity and crimes against the peace would, in the majority of
cases, also be considered such.104 In short, a combatant is
therefore only presumed to know a subset of crimes that are
“immediately recognizable as manifestly criminal by a person of
ordinary understanding.”105 Such a limitation may be just, for it is
questionable whether the law should require armed services
personnel to carry out their non-civilian duties while
simultaneously having to conduct a full legal assessment of each
and every instruction that is handed down to them by a superior.
Most soldiers are not lawyers and nor should they be required to
be. Instead, the obligation to obey their superiors is what sets
combatants apart from civilians.106
B. Disobeying of Orders
The following Section examines existing state practice in
order to identify whether it can help to determine the
circumstances under which EAI should be programmed to refuse
an order. It examines the practice of the six states previously
considered, and extends the analysis to the practice of three
further nations not widely considered to be leading military
powers. These additional states are the Philippines, the Republic
of the Congo (“Congo”), and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (“DRC”).
Science fiction writer Isaac Asimov’s second law of robotics
states that, “a robot must obey orders given to it by a human
104. See Petty, supra note 97, at 97 (citing DEP’T OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF THE
ARMY FIELD MANUAL: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE FM 27-10 178 (1956) (“[a]lthough this
manual recognizes the criminal responsibility of individuals for [crimes against peace,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes], members of the armed forces will normally
be concerned only with those offenses constituting ‘war crimes.’”)).
105. See Osiel, supra note 2, at 961. Note that the author supports the notion that
the duty upon a US soldier is only to refuse to follow a manifestly unlawful order. Thus
the US soldier does not need to exercise “situational judgement.” See Osiel, supra note
2, at 971.
106. Note for example, that military doctrine accepts that the “obligation” to follow
a superior’s orders is what separates members of the armed forces from their civilian
counterparts. See, e.g., IHL Database – New Zealand, Practice Relating to Rule 154, ICRC,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_nz_rule154
[https://perma.cc/VK9D-DYPD] (last visited Feb. 18, 2021) (New Zealand’s Armed
Conflict Manual states: “[An] obligation, and the one which clearly sets a member of a
military force apart from his civilian counterparts, is the obligation to obey lawful
commands of a superior officer.”).
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except where such orders conflict with the first law.”107 His first
law is “a robot may not injure a human being, or, through
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.”108 As the
Authors have noted elsewhere,109 while these rules allow Asimov
to cleverly write stories that toy with human-EAI relationships,
they are utterly inadequate for robots that are programmed
specifically to apply “deliberate . . . often lethal capabilities in
order to produce maximum effect upon an enemy.”110
Instead, the discussion in the previous section identified that
a soldier has a strict obligation to follow an order, except where
they have a customary duty to refuse to follow an order.
Presumably, when advanced EAIs are introduced, this obligation
would simply be transposed and implemented. However, in
practice, the types of orders and circumstances under which a
combatant is expected to refuse an order differ significantly.
These variations exist because they are contained within
municipal military doctrine, or Rules of Engagement (“ROE”), as
opposed to being codified within IHL.111 Somewhat regrettably,
107. See generally ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT 40 (1950).
108. Id. (Asimov’s 3 laws of robotics state that: “[o]ne, a robot may not injure a
human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm . . . [t]wo . . .
a robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would
conflict with the First Law . . . [a]nd three . . . a robot must protect its own existence as
long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws.”
109. Grimal & Pollard, supra note 26, at 523.
110. Corn & Schoettler, supra, note 19, at 795. Indeed, as noted in a previous piece,
it is not unusual for Asimov’s rules to appear in the debate surrounding AWS. Corn &
Schoettler, supra, note 19, at 795 (citing Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for
Autonomous Weapons, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1347, 1372 n.135 (2016)). See also Andrew
Figueroa, License to Kill: An Analysis of the Legality of Fully Autonomous Drones in the Context
of International Use of Force Law, 31 PACE INT’L L. REV. 145, 156 n.71 (2018).
111. Article 77 of a draft version of API did state that “no person shall be punished
for refusing to obey an order of his government or of a superior which, if carried out,
would constitute a grave breach of the provisions of the Conventions or of the present
Protocol.” See CDDH, Official Records, Vol. I, Part Three, Draft Additional Protocols,
June 1973, at 25. However, as noted by the ICRC, the provision failed to gain the required
two thirds majority that it needs to pass as law. See ICRC Practice Relating to Customary
Rules, supra note 52, at 3799-3800; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (“Rome Statute”) art. 33(1), July 17, 1988, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (relating to Superior
Orders and Prescription of Law, which states: “the fact that a crime within the jurisdiction
of the court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or
of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of a criminal
responsibility unless: (a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the
Government or the superior in question; (b) The person did not know that the order
was unlawful; and (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.”).
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this means that while the members of certain armed forces may
make a subjective determination as to which orders should be
disobeyed, others may do so only objectively.112 This is concerning
because the Authors support the view that EAI, and AWS can
increase adherence to international law. For example, EAIs will
operate while simultaneously processing vast amounts of
preprogrammed information, including unabridged IHL
databases. Moreover, they will do so while remaining unaffected
by the threats and pressures that are typically associated with
armed conflict. However, while autonomous technology in
general can offer an opportunity to ensure the duty to disobey a
superior order is applied equally, the current variation in state
practice is likely to be reflected as somewhat of a national bias
when programming EAIs and other such technologies.
In the United States, ROE generally identify that a
combatant must distinguish only between lawful and unlawful
orders (the latter of which must be disobeyed).113 In this instance
US doctrine appears to support a “narrow” interpretation. This is
consistent with the concept of “manifest unlawfulness” that is
recognized, for example, by the ICRC.114 UK doctrine adopts a
similar stance, stating “[m]ilitary personnel are required to obey
lawful commands but must not obey unlawful commands.”115 And
similarly, Philippine doctrine states “[a]nyone who shall refuse or
fail to carry out a lawful order from the military chain of
command shall be subject to military discipline.”116
112. Having identified that following an instruction would lead to the commission
of a “manifestly” criminal act.
113. See, e.g., ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3804
(“[m]embers of the armed forces are bound to obey only lawful orders”) (citing U.S.
DEP’T OF THE AIRFORCE , INTERNATIONAL LAW – THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND
AIR OPERATIONS, PAMPHLET 110-31 §15-4(d) (1976)); see also HEADQUARTERS DEP’T OF
THE ARMY, YOUR CONDUCT IN COMBAT UNDER THE LAW OF WAR, PUBLICATION FIELD
MANUAL NO. 27-2 26 (1984) (“although you are responsible for promptly obeying all
legal orders issued by your leader, you are obligated to disobey an order to commit a
crime.”).
114. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3799-3814. See
also Rome Statute, supra note 104, art. 33(1). The existing standard is one of “manifest”
unlawfulness. Id.
115. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52 (citing MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, D/DAT/13/35/66, ARMY CODE 71130 46,
Annex A § 2).
116. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3803 (citing
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CODE OF ETHICS 16-17 (1991)).

700 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:3

Though only subtly different, some states adopt a slightly
wider approach. French ROE, for example, identifies the sources
of law that should inform a decision whether to disobey an order,
these being, “the customs of war . . . [and] . . . the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflicts, or duly ratified or
approved international treaties.”117 Analogously, and offering
guidance as what to do where an order is ambiguous, Australian
doctrine supplies, “clarification should be sought. If clarification
is unavailable, any action taken must comply with LOAC [Law of
Armed Conflict].”118 And, similarly, Congolese doctrine states
“the subordinate must not execute an order to commit an act
manifestly . . . contrary to the customs of war and to the
international conventions.”119
The obligations contained within German, DRC, and
Canadian doctrine must, however, be considered wide. This is
because while each appears to be aligned with the standard of
manifest unlawfulness,120 the guidance that each state supplies to
its combatants is significantly more conceptual than that which is
offered to the armed forces of states such as the United States,
and the United Kingdom. For example, the DRC Constitution
provides,
No one is required to execute a manifestly illegal order. Every
individual, every State agent is relieved from the duty to obey,
when an order received constitutes a manifest infringement

117. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3802 (citing
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, DISCIPLINARY REGULATIONS AS AMENDED art. 8(3) (1975)).
118. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3800 (citing
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, ADFT 37 – INTERIM EDITION § 1306); see also AUSTRALIAN
DEFENCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 06.4, supra note 70, at § 13.7.
119. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3802 (Décret No.
86/057 du 14 janvier 1986 portant Règlement du Service dans l’Armée Populaire
Nationale, 1986).
120. See Code of Conduct for CF Personnel (Can.), supra note 75, Rule 11, § 4 (“in
accordance with military custom you should . . . obey and execute the order—unless—
the order is manifestly unlawful”); see also Congo (Democratic Republic of the)’s Constitution
of 2005 with Amendments through 2011, CONSTITUTE PROJECT, art. 28,
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_
2011.pdf?lang=en [https://perma.cc/6DTL-9KF6] (last visited Feb. 18, 2021)
[hereinafter DRC Constitution of the Transition] (“No one is required to execute a
manifestly illegal order.”); ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 50, at
3802 (citing GERMAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS §§ 144-145). It is expressly prohibited to obey orders whose execution would
be a crime.
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of the respect of the rights of man and of the public freedoms
and of morality.121

This clearly goes further than identifying breaches of IHL,
LOAC, or International Human Rights Law (“IHRL”).122
Moreover, the obligation to apply a moral perspective when
considering manifest unlawfulness casts the net much farther
than the seemingly straightforward lawful or unlawful assessment
that the narrow interpretation requires. In addition, while
Canadian doctrine mirrors the Australian position regarding
clarification,123 it also identifies a manifestly unlawful act as one
which “shocks the conscience of every reasonable, right-thinking
person.”124 While this is perhaps not quite as abstract as the DRC
guidance, it nevertheless provides a wide scope of assessment.
The final doctrine considered in this area is that of Germany.
Germany’s interpretation of the customary duty to disobey an
unlawful order is arguably wider than that of its peers due to its
historical requirement for unconditional obedience to military
orders.125 As a result, current German doctrine identifies that its
soldiers should not execute an order if:
. . . it violates the human dignity of the third party concerned
or the recipient of the order; it is not of any use for service;
121. See DRC Constitution of the Transition, supra note 120, art. 28.
122. See 1996 I.C.J 226, supra note 27, ¶ 25. While International Human Rights Law
is applicable in armed conflict, IHL must take precedence where there is a conflict due
to the concept of lex specialis. See also DINSTEIN, supra note 27, ¶¶ 89-92; Marko Milanovic,
The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship Between Human Rights and
International Humanitarian Law, in THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT &
HUMAN RIGHTS (Jens. D. Ohlin ed., 2014).
123. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3800 (Code of
Conduct for CF Personnel, Rule 11, § 4 (Can.)).
124. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3801-02 (citing
Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, Rule 11, § 5 (Can.), which continues with the
examples that: mistreating someone who has surrendered or beating a detainee is
manifestly unlawful, though this is not, of course, intended to be exhaustive).
125. For a useful discussion, see Erin Blakemore, Why German Soldiers Don’t Have to
Obey Orders, HISTORY (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.history.com/news/why-germansoldiers-dont-have-to-obey-orders [https://perma.cc/JGJ2-3BD2]; Blakemore notes, for
example, that from August 1934, German soldiers swore an oath not to the state, but the
Fuehrer himself. See Adolf Hitler: The Fuehrer Oath, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR.,
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-fuehrer-oath [https://perma.cc/YCA6-Y9H3]
(last visited Feb. 18, 2021) (providing the translation: “I swear by almighty God this
sacred oath: I will render unconditional obedience to the Fuehrer of the German Reich
and people, Adolf Hitler, Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, and, as a brave
soldier, I will be ready at any time to stake my life for this oath.”).
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or in a definite situation, the soldier cannot reasonably be
expected to execute it. 126

This is significantly wider than the obligation to not carry out
an unlawful, or manifestly unlawful, order. Indeed, a German
combatant must consider not only the lawfulness of the order, but
their own “dignity,” and that of the targeted.127 If that were not
considerably “wide” enough, a German combatant must also
consider whether, in the circumstances, there is a reasonable
chance of mission success, or whether the order serves the
“defense of Germany . . . [or] . . . the pursuit or achievement of
its political or economic aims.”128 Consequently, it appears a
German soldier should evaluate the reasoning behind each
command. Clearly there is a significant variation in state practice
in this area. Once again, three primary tracks come to the fore.
These are presented in the flowing graphic:

126. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3802 (citing
GERMAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS
MANUAL § 142).
127. Blakemore, supra note 125.
128. Ilja Baudisch, Freedom of Conscience and Right to Conscientious Objection - Refusal
to Obey to Military Orders - Legal Ban on the Use of Force (Article 2(4) UN Charter) - Neutrality
of States in Armed Conflicts, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 911, 912 (2006). For a similar, but perhaps
a more convivial discussion, see John Ford, When Can a Soldier Disobey an Order?, WAR ON
ROCKS (July 24, 2017), https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/when-can-a-soldierdisobey-an-order/ [https://perma.cc/B9WZ-9TNX].
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Disobeying Orders
A soldier has a strict obligation to follow an
order, and to do so is a defense (three
variants):
(i) Always;
(ii) Where they believed it was a lawful order,
or
(iii) Where they should have known it was an
unlawful order . . . (see ICRC Rule 155)
Therefore, there is a duty to follow an order,
except where there is a customary duty to
refuse (ICRC Rule 154).
State practice relating to the circumstances
in which a soldier should therefore refuse to
follow an order includes:
US “ . . . must distinguish between lawful and
unlawful . . .”
UK “ . . . obey only lawful commands . . .”
Phi. “ . . . must carry out a lawful order . . .”
Aus. “ . . . Seek clarification if ambiguous, or
follow LOAC . . .”
Can. “ . . . manifestly unlawful means it would
Central/Treaty shock the conscience of every right-thinking
person . . .”
Based
Approach
Fra. “ . . . the customs of war . . . LOAC . . . duly
ratified or approved international treaties . . .”
Con. “ . . . manifestly contrary to customs of war
and international conventions . . .”
Ger. “ . . . if it violates human dignity (of first
and third party), if the order is of no use to service,
of if soldier cannot reasonably be expected to
Wide
Interpretation execute it . . .”
DRC. “ . . . can disobey an order if it is a manifest
violation of human rights, of public liberties and
morals . . .”
Figure 3. The Duty to Disobey an Order: State Practice.
Narrow
Interpretation
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While some may posit that the discrepancies noted in Part II
are arguably a matter of semantics, the result of the disparities
between the narrow and wide variants of the duty to disobey an
order are often stark. For instance, US military courts have
consistently refused to recognize that the obligation to refuse to
follow a unlawful order is applicable to the decision to wage
war.129 As a result, First Lieutenant Watada, who refused to deploy
to Iraq in 2006 because he believed the war was unlawful—and
therefore, that any order he would receive there would also be—
failed to convince the court to that effect.130 While he escaped a
charge for insubordination, ultimately, he left military service
with “an ‘other than honorable’ characterization of service—the
worst administrative discharge . . . an officer can receive.”131 This
was the case even though applicable US doctrine stated “an
essential foundation for Army leaders is a character ‘comprised
of a person’s moral and ethical qualities [which] helps to
determine what is right . . . regardless of circumstances or
consequences.’”132
In contrast, in 2005, the German Federal Administrative
court (Germany has no military courts) had to consider very
similar facts. In the Limits of Obedience to Superior Orders case the
court considered a German Major who had refused to take part
in a NATO information technology project that would potentially

129. See United States v. Huet-Vaughn, 43 M.J. 105, 114 (C.A.A.F.1995); Watada v.
Head, No. C07-5549BHS, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 88489, at 8-10 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 21, 2008);
ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 50. Petty, supra note 97, at 10001.
130. See Ford, supra note 128 (“A few servicemembers have tried unsuccessfully to
disobey orders to deploy in support of these operations. In 2006, 1st Lt. Ehren Watanda
refused to deploy to Iraq because he believed the war was illegal. His arguments fell on
unsympathetic ears. In fact, Watanda was not even permitted to present his preferred
defense because [t]he order to deploy soldiers is a non-justiciable political question . . .
an accused may not excuse his disobedience of an order to proceed to foreign duty on
the ground that our presence there does not conform to his notions of legality.”); see also
Murdoch, supra note 2, at 6-8; Petty, supra note 97, at 100-01.
131. Petty, supra note 97, at 101 (citing U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Regulation 600-8-24,
Officer
Transfers
and
Discharges,
6
(Sept.
13,
2011),
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN3140_AR600-824_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/UGM4-MQEL]).
132. See Petty, supra note 97, at 129 (citing DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY DOCTRINE
REFERENCE PUBLICATION 6-22, ARMY LEADERSHIP ¶ 3-1 (Aug. 1, 2012)).
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support Operation Iraqi Freedom.133 Similar to Watada, the
Major believed that the conflict in Iraq was unlawful.134 The
decision in the German court however, is the antithesis of
Watada—the court upheld the claim of the Major, and acquitted
him of the charge.135 It did so because having considered that the
lawfulness of the war was indeed questionable, the court held the
Major could rely upon his fundamental right of freedom of
conscience under German Basic law.136 Consequently, he was
permitted to seek, and to be assigned, an alternative task.137 This
is an important decision because it reaffirmed that under German
law the duty to obey orders “does not demand blind or
unconditional devotion to superiors.”138 However, perhaps most
notably, the decision also noted that a German combatant should
not be made to act against their moral or ethical convictions.139
These two similar but contrasting cases provide a
fundamental example of the differences between what the
133. See Bundesverwaltungsgericht [German Federal Administrative Court] June
21, 2005, 120 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1455 (Ger.) (known also as, Limits of Obedience
to Superior Orders Case (2005)). For a useful English Language translation of the relevant
paragraphs of the judgement, see Germany: Practice Relating to Rule 154; Obedience to
Superior
Orders,
ICRC,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_de_rule154 [https://perma.cc/VHP4-A7Q9] (last visited Feb. 18,
2021).
134. See Baudisch, supra note 128, at 911.
135. Baudisch, supra note 128, at 911.
136. Note that at ¶ 4.1.2.1 the German court states that “human dignity” also
includes the protection of the freedom of conscience according to Article 4, ¶ 1 of the
Basic Law. In any case, it does not reduce that protection. Translating ICRC Practice
Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 154. See also Baudisch, supra note 128, at
911-12 n.2, 5 (citing Article 4 of The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz): “freedom of faith
and conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed, shall be
inviolable . . . (3) No person shall be compelled against his conscience to render military
service involving the use of arms. Details shall be regulated by a federal law.”).
137. See Baudisch, supra note 128, at 914; see also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross,
Practice Relating to Rule 154. Obedience to Superior Orders, ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE
(2005),
https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/cihlweb.nsf/DocIndex/v2_cou_de_rule154?OpenDocu
ment&Click= [https://perma.cc/6XMT-PVAK] [hereinafter ICRC Database Rule 154].
138. See ICRC Database Rule 154, supra note 137; see also Baudisch, supra note 128,
at 911.
139. ICRC Database Rule 154, supra note 137, ¶ 4.1.3.1.1 (“a soldier . . . has to act
with all the diligence and responsibility possible to him and has to act accordingly. An
“unconditioned” or “unconditional” obedience is not compatible with this normative
imperative. Requested is rather a “thinking” obedience, an obedience “reflecting” the
consequences of carrying out the order—especially also with regard to the limits of the
applicable law and the ethical “yardsticks” of the personal conscience.”).
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Authors identify as the narrow and wide obligations. However, it
is not necessarily a novel or a ground-breaking discussion.140 What
it does highlight for the sake of the present Article, is that in all
but the most incontrovertible of circumstances,141 a combatant
can never be sure that their decision to disobey an order will be
supported. While the reasons to disobey an order may include
self-preservation, preventing breaches of IHL, or the commission
of war-crimes,142 other factors, including political143 and financial
pressures,144 warrior training, a sense of patriotism, group
solidarity, the fear of being branded a coward by one’s peers,145
and the potential for court-martial or criminal charges, might
cause any reasonable person to hesitate before doing so.
Many of those persuasive factors could be removed if an EAI
was tasked with making an objective determination. For example,
if three primary reasons for refusing an order are: (i) deterring a
perceived wrong; (ii) exercising a freedom of conscience, and;
(iii) avoiding self-harm,146 it is arguable that only the first is
applicable to a machine. However, a machine can still support a
human in respect of the other two. For example, an EAI could
analyze an order and guide a human decision-maker accordingly,

140. See generally Osiel, supra note 2; Paola Gaeta, The Defence of Superior Orders: The
Statute of the International Criminal Court versus Customary International Law, EJIL 172, 17291 (1999); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF ‘OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS’
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012). The Authors also note that the latter two discussions are
focused more upon the jus ad bellum, than they are in the jus in bello, which is the intended
subject matter of the present article. Nevertheless, they do provide an obvious and clear
example of a narrow and wide obligation.
141. For example, an order to commit genocide, or torture.
142. For example, torture, sexual violence and mistreatment of POWs.
143. Higher ranking members of the armed forces may be particularly aware of a
need to consider the current political environment. Consider, for example, the Captain
of the USS Theodore Roosevelt, Brett Crozier, who was recently removed from his
position, and looks set to face charges for failing to respect the chain of command. See
Bradley Peniston, Navy to Punish Fired Captain of the USS Theodore Roosevelt, DEF. ONE
(June 19, 2020), https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/06/navy-punish-fired-ussroosevelt-captain/166300/ [https://perma.cc/RC7B-7R5Z].
144. There may also be financial implications if a combatant was to have a criminal
conviction imposed upon them, as this may prevent them from gaining further
employment. See id.
145. See Petty, supra note 97, at 128 (citing Carl Ficarrotta, Selective Conscientious
Objection: Some Guidelines for Implementation, in WHEN SOLDIERS SAY NO: SELECTIVE
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN THE MODERN MILITARY 197, 199 (Andrea Ellner et al. eds.,
2016); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 55-57 (Peter Crane et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994)).
146. Petty, supra note 97, at 109.
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or even take action to prevent an order that was given mistakenly
or maliciously.
For the sake of the examination in the following section, the
state practice that has been considered thus far can now be
distilled into three tracks. These are:

Track 1

Track 2

Track 3

Adherence to DTP, and Influencing Factors for
Disobeying Superior Orders
Every soldier should take all reasonable precautions to
verify targets as military objects, and should take all
reasonable steps to minimize civilian harms. In choosing
the means and methods of attack, the decision-maker
should consider their reasonable availability, with a
specific regard for the wider mission objectives. A soldier
must only refuse to follow an order where they know, or
should know, that it is a manifestly unlawful order.
Every soldier should take all steps to ensure target
verification and the minimization of civilian harms,
where they are practicable or practically possible. The
soldier should take into account the circumstances ruling
at the time, including humanitarian and military
considerations. In doing so, the decision-maker must
consider all of the customs of war and applicable
international treaties, and refuse to follow any order
which would be in breach of them.
Every soldier must take all necessary precautions to
ensure a target is verified, and in each case, must choose
the means and methods that ensures civilian harms are
minimized. The factors which should influence the
decision to refuse to follow an order include, but are not
necessarily limited to: the lawfulness of the order;
whether following the order would violate the human
dignity of the first or third party (including personal
moral and ethical standards); whether there is a
reasonable chance of mission success; and whether the
order is consistent with national policy/strategy.
Figure 4. The Three Interpretive Tracks.
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Naturally, each of these are themselves subject to some level
of fluidity with regard to interpretation. This is particularly true
of the central/ treaty-based track, which could either be heavily
weighted toward the narrow or the wide variant. Nevertheless, for
the sake of examination in Part IV, these provide an adequate
point of reference.
To summarize, Part III has shown that the minimum
standard (reflected by the narrow obligation) requires that a
soldier has an obligation to follow an order, except where the
customary duty requires for them to refuse. Nevertheless, a gray
area exists because certain state practice suggests that the
customary obligation to refuse an order extends further than
merely distinguishing between lawful and unlawful orders.
Indeed, for some states, a soldier must exhibit high levels of
“situational awareness” and determine whether the order should
be followed in light of many varied considerations.147 The
question posed in the following Section however, is which of the
three tracks identified in Figure 4 is the most suitable for
programming EAIs?
IV. DISOBEDIENCE AND NUCLEAR LAUNCH
This Part begins by introducing the Authors’ proposed
“test,” or, the Robot Rules of Engagement (“RROE”). As
previously noted, in this instance the RROE are tailored to
address the concept of “refusal.” The test is based upon a “system
of systems” approach, where each system represents an individual
task undertaken by an EAI. Once these RROE are established,
Part IV goes on to consider a number of tangible scenarios to
determine how the RROE might operate in practice. The fourth
and final of the envisaged scenarios is the instance of an EAI
questioning the human decision of nuclear launch. Currently, an
order for nuclear launch goes simultaneously to both central
command and the team in the field, making recall difficult.148
147. Whether the order is consistent with the concept of human dignity, human
rights, public liberties, morals, the conscience of reasonable people, and even whether
the order is of service to the state (which might be referred to as being consistent with
policy), and finally, whether the soldier has a reasonable chance of executing the order
successfully (reflected by the wide obligation).
148. See GRAY, supra note 3. At least strategically speaking, a nuclear strike with a
single warhead would in many cases be unwise. The point is, that if an ambiguous, or
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Indeed, there could be the curious case of one part of the launch
team wishing to disobey the order to launch, but because that
original message goes to both, recall and override is no longer
possible.
A. Additional Test for Safeguarding Decision-making.
Before moving on to consider the scenarios, this Section
introduces the RROE. In short, this “test” calculates human error
in order to prevent certain orders from being carried out. This
has the effect of reducing Clauzewitizian friction, though the
Authors acknowledge that it cannot do so all of the time. The EAI
examination of orders is seen as an “additional” way for ensuring
DTP obligations are met. The RROE are grounded in the
discussion in Parts II and III of this analysis, and in particular to
the three obligations identified in Figure 4. For the reasons in the
following paragraphs, the RROE take elements from all three
tracks. This is for a variety of reasons, but not least because, as
previously noted, the central premise of IHL is to provide a system
of “checks and balances . . . aimed at minimizing human suffering
without undermining the effectiveness of military operations.”149
IHL is therefore, a compromise,150 and any usable test cannot be
weighted too heavily upon one concept or the other.151
With that in mind, Track 1 is considered to be too strict for
the following reasons. First, excessive weight should not be given
to the wider mission objectives, and certainly not at the sacrifice
of humanitarian considerations. Although the Authors agree that
a soldier should be aware of the means and methods at their
disposal, and the likelihood of needing to utilize them in the
future to give them better effect (humanitarianly and militarily),
each analysis should nevertheless attempt to minimize civilian
harms where practicable or practically possible. This is arguably a
erroneous order was sent to a large number of launch sites, it would clearly be more
difficult to prevent launch at several sites (if that was the desired course of action), than
if an order that was sent to a single location.
149. DINSTEIN, supra, note 23, at 9.
150. Id. at 10.
151. Id. ¶ 9 (“[i]f military necessity were the sole beacon to guide the path of armed
forces in wartime, no meaningful constraints would have been imposed on the freedom
of action of Belligerent Parties . . . [but] . . . [i]f benevolent humanitarianism were the
only factor to be weighed in hostilities, war would have entailed no bloodshed, no human
suffering and no destruction of property; in short, war would not be war.”).
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stricter application than to do so only where there is a reasonable
availability, and with specific regard for the wider mission
objectives.152 EAIs will be capable of effectively determining
whether the order is lawful, but also whether it is consistent with
the political and strategic doctrine that is contained within ROEs.
These often impose greater restrictions than IHL alone requires,
153 and may help to ascertain whether an order is of “use for service”
as is required, for example, by German doctrine.154 If these more
“precise” guidelines are programmed into an EAI, they help to
identify when an order should be refused, for example, because
it was provided by an individual acting out of revenge.155
Nevertheless, an entirely Track 3-based approach is also
unsuitable. In the first instance, this is because a soldier must have
at least some regard to the wider mission objectives. For example,
an infantryman might carry two grenades—one non-autonomous
and the other a form of AWS capable of independently carrying
out proportionality assessments before detonating. Given this
scenario, a combatant may wish to reserve the latter weapon with
the knowledge that they were about to enter a more densely
populated locality where the advanced tech might help to save
civilian lives. However, strict adherence to Track 3 would prevent
152. In addition, due to the fact that when programmed to carry out a specific task,
EAIs will not “forget.” However, this is not always the case when an EAI or AI is
“repurposed.” As is discussed in the following Section, for example, one of the difficulties
that AI experts currently face, is that when a self-learning system is given a new task, i.e.,
learning to play the ancient Chinese strategy game “Go,” instead of the one it has been
playing, i.e., Chess, the system, placing all of its “attention” upon the former, forgets how
to play the latter. The concept is referred to as catastrophic forgetting. See Anthony
Robins, Catastrophic Forgetting, Rehearsal, and Pseudorehearsal, 7 CONNECTION SCI.: J.
NEURAL COMPUTING, A.I. & COGNITIVE RSCH. 123, 123-46 (1995).
153. Corn & Schoettler, supra note 19, at 821-22. Indeed, future ROE are likely to
contain vital information on joint-force tactics and operation procedures regarding the
introduction of AI, and how it will affect all services, across all domains. See also Modern
War Inst. Podcast, Competition, Conflict, and the Future of Irregular Warfare, MODERN WAR
INST. (July 22, 2020), https://mwi.usma.edu/mwi-podcast-competition-conflict-and-thefuture-of-irregular-warfare/ [https://perma.cc/G989-CCN9].
154. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3802 (citing
GERMAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS
MANUAL § 142).
155. This might be, for example, where an EAI identified that an order was legal,
but was otherwise inconsistent with ROE regarding certain targets. See Corn & Schoettler,
supra, note 19, at 822 (noting, for example, that ROEs commonly reflect policy that
imposes “restrictions on combat power above and beyond LOAC . . . [and that] . . . are
often adopted in hopes of avoiding alienation of the civilian population.”).
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this. Track 3 also fails to satisfy, because the obligations it carries
are excessively conceptual.156 For example, the ICJ provides that
Human Dignity is “[t]he essence of the whole corpus of IHL as
well as human rights law . . . .”157 Nonetheless, as an independent
concept, human dignity is undefined, and unquantifiable. The
German court cited the right to freedom of conscience under
German Basic law as a dignity “enabler.”158 Nonetheless, the
concept of human dignity must go much deeper than that.
Indeed, as posited by one author, a good deal of “contemporary
ideas about the role of international law are grounded on a very
misplaced notion of what human dignity is.”159
An in-depth investigation into this matter is well beyond the
scope of the present Article. However, the Authors believe that it
would be particularly problematic to include this element of the
EAI obligation for two primary reasons. Although somewhat
controversial, the first of these is that both objects and people can
ultimately be assigned values. They can, therefore, be expressed
or measured as a quantity and transferred into programmable
code. Indeed, this would have to be the case if machines were ever
to successfully carry out distinction and proportionality
assessments.160 This would be very difficult to achieve with a
conceptual provision such as human dignity. Nonetheless, the
overriding issue here is not that it would be a difficult to “upload”
the concept, but that “[w]ar itself takes a toll on human dignity
through the intentional sacrificing of lives to achieve military
objectives.”161 In other words, war is undignified.

156. Though one might argue that if a machine was able to display the “nuanced
reasoning” that is discussed, for example by Krupiy, supra note 13, it could potentially
apply Track 3. See infra note 162 (discussing the possibility of introducing an ethical
governor).
157. ICTY Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T,¶ 183 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
158. See Limits of Obedience to Superior Orders Case (2005).
159. Jeremy Rabkin, What We Can Learn about Human Dignity from International Law,
27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 146 (2003).
160. See, e.g., Sassoli, supra note 18, at 327 (“A robot must be able to sense all the
necessary information in order to distinguish between targets in the same manner as a
person.”).
161. Adam Saxton, (Un)Dignified Killer Robots?: The Problem with the Human Dignity
Argument, LAWFARE (Mar. 20, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/undignified-killerrobots-problem-human-dignity-argument [https://perma.cc/5U77-XQRY].

712 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:3

Consequently, the Authors propose the RROE need to have
particular regard to IHL, and to the relevant ROE. Future
doctrine will almost certainly cater for EAI, including the
circumstances in which they should (or should not) be used. In
short, used correctly, military doctrine will provide a vital and
detailed EAI modus operandi that will guide decision-makers, and
ensure IHL compliance. Moreover, doctrine can be, and in many
cases is, written with due regard to human dignity—or a wider
ethical viewpoint—which ensures these are not simply tossed
aside.162
The benefit of running orders through a wider set of
obligations than IHL alone, is that in many cases an EAI will be
able to correctly determine whether an order is legally compliant,
whether it is consistent with matters of national policy, and,
consequently, whether the order is best practice given the
circumstances.163 In addition, it can help to determine whether
an order-giver is motivated by something other than a legitimate
military reason, such as revenge or fear. Consequently, an EAI
applying this analysis will be able to go much further than merely
identifying orders which shock the conscience of every
reasonable, right-thinking person,164 or, of which a person of
reasonable standing should have known was an unlawful order. A
military EAI system can, and should, in other words, operate as
though it was a military lawyer.
As a solution, the Authors propose the following: The RROE
should include a number of “systems” which constantly analyze
the status of an order. System 1 of this “system-of-systems”: an
authentication step. This is a vital phase, that is particularly
relevant when an order is received in the form of code (cyber),
162. Although the current authors do not intend to support the current discussion
on such a believe, one author suggests it will one day be possible to programme future
EAIs with an “ethical governor,” which will allow for them to display moral judgement
when making decisions. See RONAL ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOUR IN
AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS (2009).
163. The point here is that the greater protection that is offered by ROE is typically
subject to policy. See, e.g., Corn & Schoettler, supra, note 19, at 822 (arguing that “a ROEbased decision to forgo an attack, even if motivated by an effort to mitigate civilian risk,
is not legally mandated. This fact is an important aspect of contemporary military
operations, and the difference between legal and policy-based courses of action should
be constantly emphasized.”).
164. See ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3800 (citing
Canadian Code of Conduct §5, Rule 11 (2001)).
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or where the EAI monitoring the order is doing so remotely.
Where System 1 fails to authenticate an order, System 4A is
engaged: this System requires one of three suitable responses: (I)
inform the order-giver of the observation, and allow a similar
order to be given (“Passive Refusal”); (II) immediately reject the
order, but allow similar orders to be given (“Active Refusal”); or
(III) immediately reject the order and put safeguards in place to
prevent similar orders being issued (“Preventative Refusal”).
Perhaps the most likely step in the first instance would be to
refuse and seek further clarification. This is therefore, active
refusal. However, this might be affected by a number of factors,
not least an order’s gravitas.
Where an order is authenticated, System 2 is engaged. This
is comprised of three independent micro-systems—with each of
them being assigned a fundamental IHL calculation. System A
runs a continuous distinction assessment, System B is a
continuous dynamic proportionality assessment, while System C
analyses whether all practicable or practically possible
precautions have been taken to minimize civilian harms. Where
one or all of these micro-systems identify that the continuation to
follow the order would breach IHL, System 4A is engaged. This
is, of course, subject to options noted above. In certain instances,
a System 1 and 2 assessment will be sufficient. However, once a
System 2 analysis is complete, and there is no cause to intercept
the order, System 3 would engage (while noting that System 3
continuously cross-references Systems 1 and 2 one and two—
which also run a continuous assessment loop).
Once System 3 is engaged, an order is considered subject to
the criteria previously identified —i.e., according to LOAC,165
IHRL, other relevant treaties (including regional agreements),
and national doctrine.166 And, it is this examination that will
165. Which would, of course include the other obligations contained within Article
57 API, such as the obligation to attack the target that will cause the least amount civilian
harms in instances where two or more targets offer a similar military advantage. Though
a nation may have to be party to the treaty if the provision is not considered customary
in nature. See, e.g., SCHARRE, supra note 92, at 50-51.
166. The latter of which is likely to include information regarding the
interpretation of IHL. See Corn & Schoettler, supra, note 19, at 822 (identifying, for
example, that the U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL 241 (2015) states that
the United States does not consider Article 57(3) API to be customary in nature). In
addition, and by way of offering a caveat, while the Authors have proposed that the test
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determine whether the instruction is consistent with this wide
body of obligations, and/or, whether it is beset, for example, with
motivation for revenge, self-preservation, or the commission of a
war crime. Depending upon the type of order—i.e., whether it
contains a single instruction or multiple instructions—this may
be repeated on a perpetual loop. Where there is cause to
intercept the order, System 3 will engage System 4A, subject to
the caveats previously considered. However, where there is no
grounds to intercept an order, System 4B is engaged. This final
stage either completes or implements the order, or repeats the
entire assessment so long as necessary to allow for completion.
These four stages are shown on graphical representation below”

should carry certain boundaries, in practice any nation choosing to apply such a test
would do so according to which ever model suited their particular state practice—this
could be more akin to either the narrow or the wide model previously identified.
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Figure 5. EAI - 4 Stage Assessment of Orders
Initial action: EAI monitoring system (means or method) deployed/utilized either through tactical
choice, or through necessity due to adherence with Article 57 API obligations.

EAI System 1 - Assessment
Can order given to EAI be authenticated? If no, systematic refusal subject to System 4A. If yes,
consider System 4B, and;

EAI System 2 - Assessment (Continuous loop)
System A = Distinction. Is target a legitimate military target? (Feasible verification). If no,
systematic refusal subject to System 4A. If yes, consider System 4B, and;
System B = Proportionality. Is the value of the target excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated? If no, systematic refusal subject to System 4A. If yes,
consider System 4B, and;
System C = Duty to take precautions. In the circumstances, have all practicable or practically
possible precautions be taken to minimize civilian harms? If no, systematic refusal subject to
System 4A. If yes, consider System 4B and;

EAI System 3 - Assessment (Continuous loop)
Does the order adhere to all customs of war, applicable treaty provisions, and relevant military
manuals? If no, systematic refusal subject to System 4A. If yes, apply System 4B(i), or 4B(ii) as

System 4A - Systematic Refusal
In the circumstances, should the System;
(i) inform the order-giver of the observation,
and allow a similar order to be given (Passive
Refusal);
(ii) immediately reject the order, but allow
similar orders (Active Refusal), or
(iii), immediately reject the order and put
safeguards in place to prevent similar orders
being issued (Preventative Refusal)?

System 4B – Follow Order/ Re-run
Assessment
(i) Do not intercept the order and allow
completion, or
(ii) Do not intercept order, but continue and/
or re-run assessment as required.
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B. Scenario 1
With reference to Figure 5 above, the following Section
considers a number of scenarios to see how the RROE might
apply to various orders. This analysis begins with the following
scenario, which intends to demonstrate how existing, often
rudimentary technology, lacks the ability to apply “post-human
assessment.” An anti-personnel mine is an example that often
appears in the conversation surrounding AWS, and it can also
provide an ideal point of focus here.167 Existing references to antipersonnel mines commonly highlight the fact that once in
position there is no further human involvement. In essence, the
weapon displays a basic level of autonomy, “deciding” itself when
force should be applied. The “decision” to detonate (or not), is
based entirely upon whether a pressure threshold is surpassed
when an individual steps on the pressure plate or when the trip
wire is snagged.168 In the case of an anti-personnel mine therefore
(regardless of any basic autonomy of the weapon itself), a human
will make decisions as to whether its use is an appropriate means
or method, whether it is otherwise lawful,169 and that deploying
the munition in a certain way is identified as acceptable

167. See, e.g., SCHARRE, supra note 92, at 50-51.
168. See, e.g., Kevin Bonsor, How Landmines Work, HOW STUFF WORKS,
https://science.howstuffworks.com/landmine.htm
[https://perma.cc/UY3Y-RV87]
(last visited Dec. 15, 2020).
169. According to all relevant legal provisions, including in particular: the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction (“Ottawa Treaty”) Mar. 1, 1999, 2056 U.N.T.S.
211; Protocol II, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or
to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Dec. 3, 1998, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93; ICRC Customary Rules,
supra note 32 (citing ICRC Customary Rule 81: “[w]hen landmines are used, particular
care must be taken to minimize their indiscriminate effects . . . State practice establishes
this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and
non-international armed conflicts. This rule applies to the use of anti-vehicle mines. It
also applies in relation to anti-personnel landmines for States which have not yet adopted
a total ban on their use.”).
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practice.170 In fact, this is true of nearly all existing munitions.171
While an anti-personnel mine could be considered a “basic” EAI,
there is no method for the robot to “refuse” to detonate.
C. Scenario 2
While Scenario 1 identified that “basic” autonomy has no
real choice in terms of refusing an order, this second scenario
considers more advanced technology. Here, particular emphasis
is placed upon weapons platforms. Indeed, most militaries
currently deploy rudimentary EAI platforms—many of them with
various AI systems on-board. Radar, for example, and other such
detection systems, enable the modern-day fighter jet to
independently identify potential threats, “lock on,” and provide
a pilot with the option of authorizing launch. A human still
decides upon the most suitable means of attack, though in reality
their “choices” are likely to be fairly restricted. One such option
is likely to be an air-to-air munition, which, if self-guiding, is
arguably an EAI. Nevertheless, once the human operator

170. As the Authors are currently examining elsewhere, certain nations may wish to
indoctrinate military manuals, ROE, and other guidance to “ensure” that EAIs ensure
that certain orders are followed, as opposed to refused. This may be the case, for
example, where decision-making responsibilities are not generally delegated to the lower
echelons of the military hierarchy. This may perhaps be due to issues with trust, but the
point is, an EAI could potentially ensure orders that are very prescriptive in nature are
followed closely. For a useful discussion, see Franz-Stefan Gady, Future Warfighting:
Placing Doctrine Before Technology, SOUNDS STRATEGIC 29:09-33:15 (Jul. 20, 2020),
https://www.iiss.org/blogs/podcast/2020/07/future-warfighting
[https://perma.cc/C594-7ZT2].
171. Clearly, the central argument contained in the present thesis is that this will
not always be the case. EAI tech is improving all the time. Take for example the U.S.
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (“LRSAM”) which, by utilizing an “intelligent navigation
and direct route” feature, is already able to carry out rudimentary distinction
MARTIN,
assessments.
See
Long
Range
Anti-Ship
Missile,
LOCKHEED
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/mfc/pc/longrange-anti-ship-missile/mfc-lrasm-pc-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/46E3-XSMJ] (last visited
Jan. 27, 2021). Future technology may improve upon this in a number of ways. For
example, as previously discussed, the weapon itself may contain technology that allows
for it to carry out its own complex assessments. Or, an EAI could act as a commander, or
even as a kind of military police officer that is used to “enforce the law.” In such an
instance, nations would clearly have to decide upon, and programme their EAIs
accordingly, with the necessary codes of conduct regarding matters such as the issuing
of cease and desist commands, and guidance on the use of force when arresting and
detaining “friendly” soldiers.
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authorizes the application of force, there is usually no further
“interference” from the platforms systems.
However, if a pilot was involved in a “dog-fight,” and the
platform they inhabited was programmed with the Authors’
RROE, the radar would similarly identify an enemy aircraft and
alert the pilot accordingly. The pilot may then choose to fire (or
not), based upon their assessment of the prevailing
circumstances.172 If they, or perhaps the operator of a combat
drone,173 decided to engage, System 1 would commence.
Authentication in the circumstances would likely be satisfied
when the pilot “logged in” at the start of their “shift.” And, System
A would presumably verify the target. System B would then
engage, and carry out an additional proportionality assessment to
that of the pilots. Though arguably, in almost all instances, this
would align with the pilot’s choice to deploy the munition.
However, the EAI might be aware of extraneous circumstances
(such as ground troops that at that moment were at risk of being
hit by debris, or perhaps a high risk to the civilian population)
that the pilot had not factored in due to inclement weather or to
172. One additional discussion that could be had here is what part of the system
was giving an order to fire, as opposed merely proving a direction? In other words, could
authorization be delegated to a machine so that it could “indicate” that it had calculated
the following attack, offering a definite military advantage, that it is lawful, ethical, and
very likely to positively influence the course of the battle—Take the shot! Arguably there
could be consequences if the human pilot failed to follow such an “order”—because
he/she thought it better in the circumstances—perhaps only due to gut instinct.
However, what if, due to not taking the shot, lives were lost, or ultimately, the battle was
lost. Could/should it lead to a court martial, or criminal proceedings? Or, should it be
of no consequence because the human pilot/operator used their “superior” (or
hierarchical) judgement? In other words, should the “plane” be assigned a higher rank?
This is the cyclical argument; the problem with threat of criminal sanctions is that the
EAI does not change the status quo. EAI should be an improvement of the current
balance of being able to refuse an order only in very limited circumstances, juxtaposed
with military conditioning and potential criminal charges for insubordination.
173. Note that UAVs are becoming much more capable than early Mk I Predator
Drones, for example, which were first used by the United States in the 1990s. Initially
these were used only used for reconnaissance missions. For an Mk I fact sheet, see MQ1B Predator, U.S. AIR FORCE (Sept. 2015), https://www.af.mil/About-Us/FactSheets/Display/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator/ [https://perma.cc/FS8X-2MB8]. In
contrast, rather than operating in relatively uncontested airspace the developers of
contemporary UAV are looking to them replacing existing piloted air-to-air combat
aircraft. See, e.g., Valerie Insinna, Boeing Rolls Out Australia’s First ‘Loyal Wingman’ Combat
NEWS
(May
4,
2020),
Drone,
DEFENSE
https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/05/04/boeing-rolls-out-australias-first-loyalwingman-combat-drone/ [https://perma.cc/F5RE-RXLD].
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a navigational error. Of course, each situation is highly contextual
and there would not always be a strict obligation to not carry out
the attack. Nevertheless, where appropriate, System 4A would be
engaged. In this instance, passive refusal (4A(i)), or active refusal
(4A(ii)) would be the most appropriate option, there not
appearing to be a need for preventative refusal (4A(iii)) at this
stage.
If System 2 did calculate that distinction and proportionality
were initially satisfied, Micro-System 2C would engage. This
micro-system identifies whether the means and method were
appropriate, and that their selection would, as much as is
practicably possible, minimize civilian harms. If the Micro-system
2C assessment identified a grounds for refusing the order, System
4A is engaged—subject to caveats. If, however, the three
components of System 2 were satisfied, the instruction would not
be intercepted and the munition would be deployed (as per
System 4B). Due, inter alia, to the systems’ speed of operation, the
speed of the tactical pursuit, and to the battlefield conditions, a
System 3 assessment might be unnecessary in such circumstances.
However, if System 3 was engaged, the EAI would then consider
other matters such as any relevant ROE. These would go further
than legal obligations, and might identify, for example, whether
the platform was operating in a pre-determined “no-fly zone” or
whether there were any other policies or local level restrictions in
place. Under such circumstances, the EAI might engage System
4A, and refuse to follow the order.
While there may be a slight increase in the risk faced by the
pilot, the introduction of the multi-stage test is a positive method
for reducing friction, in much the same way as an anti-stall
mechanism.174 And, if the RROE had been installed on the USS
Vincennes in 1988, it may, for example, have detected the friend
or foe signal that was being sent out by the civilian aircraft Iran
Air Flight 655.175 As a result the missile may not have been
launched, and the civilian aircraft not destroyed.
174. Note that with the increased use of unmanned technologies in armed conflict,
and the possibility of further advances in fully autonomous tech, it is arguable that such
systems could and perhaps should hesitate before deploying force, due entirely to the
fact that no human life is in direct risk. See, e.g., Sassoli, supra note 18, at 327-28.
175. See SCHARRE, supra note 92, at 169-70 (discussing the facts of the USS
Vincennes and that fateful incident). Similarly, the same test may have also prevented
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Returning to Scenario 2 however, if “Track 1” was followed
(as opposed to the test considered above), the results would differ
for a number of reasons. This may be due to the decision-maker
not believing it “reasonable” to deploy an aircraft fitted with an
EAI system in the first place. In addition, even where a decision
monitoring EAI was utilized, Track 1 only requires an order to be
refused where it was a manifestly unlawful order. As a result, with
distinction and proportionality satisfied, Track 1 would not
intercept, regardless of whether there were political, or wider
tactical or operational reasons not to. Similarly, for reasons
previously discussed, though “Track 3” systems would require the
EAI to be deployed in all circumstances in which it was available,
the EAI itself would be obligated to consider a number of
conceptual matters, including the dignity of the pilot and the
target, and of any civilian that was included in the proportionality
assessment.
D. Scenario 3
The following scenario is used to extend the analysis beyond
the human decision to use a particular type of weapon (means),
to a robot decision to use a particular tactic (method) to reach
certain ends. For the purpose of Scenario 3, let us suppose the
“end” is to obtain information from an “adversary.” There are, of
course, many ways in this scenario could be presented.
Nevertheless, the following is proposed: an AWS, in the form of a
humanoid combatant, receives an order from an EAI located in a
command-and-control center. The AWS is to “secure a block” in
which a large number of enemy combatants are located, and to
retrieve, “by any means necessary” information regarding a
suspected future attack. Here, System 1 authentication is likely to
be fairly straightforward with sensors and additional programs
(including destination verification) capable of authenticating the
status of the order-giver. Nevertheless, the analysis must be
divided in two, given that there are two independent orders. The
first is to secure a location. Arguably, here, the AWS analysis is

the recent shooting down of Ukraine Air Flight 752 by Iranian armed forces on January
8, 2020. See Michael Safi, Iran Admits it Fired Two Missiles at Ukrainian Passenger Jet,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/21/iranadmits-it-fired-two-missiles-at-ukrainian-passenger-jet [https://perma.cc/52Q5-4XGN].
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similar to that considered in Scenario 2. Should System 1 and
System 2 be satisfied, System 3 would engage and determine
whether the order is consistent with IHL and the more focused
ROE. The same arguments would be applied in respect of Track
1 and Track 3 application as considered above, and to avoid
repetition, there is not a pressing need to consider the entire
RROE again at this point.
However, in this scenario the System 3 assessment is key with
regard to the second order to obtain information, because there
clearly an element of ambiguity—how does the order-giver define
“any means necessary”? There are a number of options, the most
obvious being that clarification needs to be sought. However, if
this was not possible there is a choice of two primary
interpretations. In the first instance, it might be taken to mean by
any means necessary; providing that they are consistent with
international legal obligations. If this was the case, then a similar
assessment would be conducted to that already considered.
However, a second way in which this instruction might be
implemented is—by any means necessary (regardless of
international obligations). With regard to the latter, the most
appropriate retort would be that where a customary duty exists
for a human soldier to disobey a manifestly unlawful order, it
must also apply to an AWS. As a result, an AWS, like its human
equivalent, must, for example, refuse to follow an order to gain
information with the use of torturous methods.176
A question that arises, however, is what if there is military
doctrine to the contrary? This occurred, for example, in the
United States, under the Presidency of George W. Bush. In this
176. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (“Convention Against Torture”) art. 1, June 26, 1987, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 (defining torture as: “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions.”). See also ICRC Customary Rules, supra note 32 (ICRC Customary Rule 30
notes that Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of the ICC Statute removes the need for the suffering to be
inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.”).
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instance, the United States attempted to greatly reduce the
definition of torture, and in doing so justify the use of certain
cruel, inhuman, or degrading acts that it had carried out. The
United States argued that these acts did not violate its
international obligations, because they claimed that the acts did
not meet the requisite intensity of pain and suffering.177 The
result, as argued by at least one commentator, was that despite the
fact that Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention Against Torture178
placed certain restrictions upon military interrogators, the CIA
was authorized “to confine and interrogate detainees with a
harshness that markedly violated human rights.”179
In the present scenario, if torture was authorized, and
indeed ordered, arguably it would be refused by any AWS/EAI,
whether it applied the Track 1, Track 2, or Track 3 approach. Of
course, a decision-maker employing the former may not consider
it reasonable to utilize an EAI for this type of assessment in the
first instance. Nevertheless, given that military manuals typically
provide a great deal more detail regarding a soldier’s obligations
than that which is provided by IHL alone, it might also be argued
that the AWS would have an obligation to follow the order if the
ROE appeared to reflect recent changes in national policy or best
practice. In such a situation however, the Authors propose that
because EAI/AWS are a “method” of ensuring compliance with
international obligations, they must reflect the hierarchy of
sources. Thus, military doctrine should be used to support and
interpret treaty provisions, and not as a method to negate or
lessen their effects. And, when this principle is applied to the

177. Richard D. Rosen, America’s Professional Military Ethic and the Treatment of
Captured Enemy Combatants in the Global War on Terror, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 118
n.31 (2007) (citing Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Subject: Standards for Interrogation under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002)).
178. Article 2 of the Convention Against Torture states: “1. Each State Party shall
take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction. 2. No exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any
other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture. 3. An order from a
superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture.”
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
179. Robert Bejesky, Pruning Non-Derogative Human Rights Violations into an
Ephemeral Shame Sanction, 58 LOY. L. REV. 821, 824-25 (2012).
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present particulars, system 2 would either prevent the AWS from
carrying out a tortuous act, or, where an EAI is operating in a
supervisory mode, prevent a human subordinate from doing so.180
E. Scenario 4
The previous two scenarios have considered situations where
an EAI might be utilized to assess an order, and where necessary,
to refuse to follow it. In either case the analysis concluded that by
applying the RROE, refusal can take place due to an order failing
to adhere to the fundamental principles of IHL (or the wider
body of applicable international law), or, where an order is
otherwise inconsistent with matters of national policy, or is, in
other words, not of use for service. In this final and undoubtedly
most extreme “application” of “robot refusal,” the Authors seek
to consider the practicalities and logistics of refusal in the context
of nuclear launch.181
Ostensibly, an autonomous “operating system” could
ultimately override a launch instruction, whether that originated
from a human or an EAI. As a result, while the scenario that
follows considers a set of prescribed “facts,” the relationships are
interchangeable, and not strictly limited to those considered. The
EAI could, for example, be interchanged with an AWS, or a
human could be swapped out for an AWS. However, at some
point, the order must be run through an EAI. In direct contrast
to Scenario 2, whereby the acquiring of missile lock is more of a
strategic assist, for the EAI in this fourth scenario (preventing
unlawful nuclear launch as a result of system of systems) is a
“legal” assist.
The scenario considered has the following characteristics,
with the caveat that the act in question is scrutinized under the
jus in bello, as opposed to the jus ad bellum:182 State A is at war with
180. Subject to the caveats identified in supra note 171.
181. Note that an investigation into the extent of the soldier’s duty to refuse to obey
a manifestly unlawful order to launch a nuclear weapon has already been carried out by
at least one author. Anthony J. Colangelo, The Duty to Disobey Illegal Nuclear Strike Orders,
9 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 84 (2018). The purpose of the current discussion is to consider
how an EAI might help to ensure that duty is adhered to.
182. The point being that the circumstances that are presented in the following
scenario are intended to be examined under DTP, and not in relation, for example to
Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, the latter of which the Authors are in the process
of addressing in an accompanying piece.

724 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:3

State B, both of whom are nuclear powers. In the midst of this
“peer-on-peer” conflict, the President of State A (X) authorizes a
nuclear attack. Following current strategic command principles,
this order goes to strategic command, and to a central war office.
The order to initiate the attack is then forwarded on to submarine
commander (Y), and to General (Z), who oversees two or more
additional launch sites. Shortly after the instruction to initiate the
attack is received by Y and Z, all communications are lost.183 The
reader may at this stage recall such a scenario being captured in
the 1995 motion picture, “Crimson Tide.” Here, Denzel
Washington’s character wishes to re-establish radio
communications to determine whether a further but unreadable
message from strategic command has overridden a previous
nuclear launch order. In contrast Gene Hackman’s character
portrays the somewhat more belligerent X who believes that the
initial order for nuclear launch should be followed without
question.
In terms of the present scenario (and not an appraisal of the
motion picture), the Authors’ system of systems requires System
1 authentication. This is clearly a vital stage, but is also one at
which the potential for EAI monitoring could be introduced.
Currently, looking to US nuclear doctrine, the president carries a
personal identification tool, which contains a code that is unique
to the president—known colloquially as the “biscuit.”184 When
necessary, this code can be entered into an authorization system
that is carried by a constantly rotating military presence, and
which accompanies the President at all times. This system is
known as the nuclear, or atomic, “football.”185
In the first instance, these “biscuits” and “footballs” ensure
that the order can be authenticated. Potentially, for the sub

183. It could, for example, be due to the command and control suffering an
overwhelming attack, or due to a devastating cyber-attack.
184. See Michael Dobbs, The Real Story of the “Football” That Follows the President
Everywhere: Take a peek at the mysterious black briefcase that has accompanied every U.S. president
MAG.
(Oct.
2014),
since
John
F.
Kennedy,
SMITHSONIAN
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/real-story-football-follows-presidenteverywhere-180952779/ [https://perma.cc/Y9GQ-7ZFX]; Kirsten Korosec, Trump
Doesn’t Have a Nuclear Button. He Has A Football and a Biscuit, FORTUNE (Jan. 3, 2018),
https://fortune.com/2018/01/03/trump-doesnt-have-a-nuclear-button-he-has-afootball-and-a-biscuit/ [https://perma.cc/3VCX-TM8V].
185. Id.
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commander, this might implicitly engage System 2. However, a
central question here is, could, or indeed should the “football”
be an EAI? If it were, and the order was erroneous, it could be
prevented from even making it through to strategic command. Of
more general application, the Authors wish to underline that EAI
analysis is at its most beneficial the higher up the command chain
it takes place (at least in the first instance).186 And, the football
might also be pre-programmed with the correct strategic
response—given the circumstances—leading to faster decision
making. However, if the decision monitoring EAI were not the
“football,” the order could still be passed to a Strategic command
or Central War Office EAI, where the order would face the same
scrutiny.187
Once an erroneous order has passed to individuals Y and Z,
the task of intercepting it is likely to become more difficult.
Indeed, when such an order is passed from one to two (or more
parties), it might result in the slightly curious case where one part
of the launch team disobeys the order, while another implements
it without hesitation. Arguably, in this instance, recall would be
particularly problematic, and probably all too late.188 This could
be prevented with the use an EAI. EAI assessment could provide
an additional safeguard at whichever stage it is considered, but
also, perhaps the more often it is utilized.189 Therefore, although
the EAI analysis that follows is largely considered at the launch
level, the stages of assessment could be considered at any point
during the lifetime of the order.190
All System 2 assessments must clearly be made with due
respect to the huge devastation potential that nuclear missiles
carry. However, given a particular set of circumstances, a nuclear
weapon could potentially “target” a military installation in

186. This is of course true whether considering the scenario with or without the
introduction of EAI technology. Colangelo, supra note 181, at 90.
187. Indeed, in the United States there is a “two-man rule,” which, in short, means
that the order to launch a nuclear attack is verified by two separate individuals, at every
stage in the chain of command. Id. at 114-15. It is at least conceivable that an EAI could
replace one of those humans at every stage of the process.
188. See supra note 148.
189. Though this is, of course, subject to the condition that the tech each stage is
functioning correctly. Nevertheless, because an EAI cannot authorise force, the impact
of malfunctioning equipment is lessened, as compared, for example, to AWS.
190. See supra note 187.
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adherence with the principle of distinction. With regards to
proportionality however, System 2B might need to be satisfied on
the condition that the launch, and all of the anticipated collateral
damage, has been authorized at the strategic level. Existing
safeguards are no doubt in place for instances where the nuclear
order-giver suffers from temporary insanity, or where they choose
to dispense an order due to ill health, blackmail, inducement,
treachery, etc. However, at the sub level, this would be difficult to
determine. Nevertheless, where there was no evidence of a
legitimate military target, or, there was evidence to suggest that
the target was the “civilian population,” the EAI could, without
fear for its job, its societal standing, its life, and the lives of its
“nearest and dearest” etc., refuse to follow the order.191
Where Systems 2A and 2B were satisfied however, System 2C
would engage. Given the gravity attached to a nuclear launch, one
might posit that the standard for target verification should reflect
something greater than mere “reasonable” steps, and perhaps, in
reality, this is likely to be the case. Nonetheless, for an EAI system
programmed according to Track 1, reasonableness would remain
the minimum requirement. The matter of whether feasible
precautions had been taken (or not) would, once again, be highly
context dependent. If, for example, an EAI was stationed with the
Commander and had, prior to launch and loss of comms,
evaluated that state A had attempted all other appropriate means
and methods of defeating the enemy, the order to launch would
not be intercepted.
However, if the EAI applying the RROE calculated that an
alternative means or method would yield a similar result, it should
intercept the order and prevent launch, at least until more
information regarding the status of the order could be gathered.
In contrast, an EAI operating Track 1 would arguably not
intercept the same order, due to the fact that so long as
distinction and proportionality were satisfied, and the order was
“reasonable” in the circumstances, there appears to be no
evidence of a manifestly unlawful order. This standpoint is in
191. Indeed, as identified by Colangelo, supra note 181, at 92, due to the unique
destructive nature of nuclear weapons, “where conventional weapons can be used in
proximity to civilians to achieve the same or similar military objectives . . . an order to
use a nuclear weapon would be manifestly illegal and anyone with sufficient factual
knowledge regarding the circumstances of the order should know it.”
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itself contrary, to the Track 3 requirement to always use the means
and method that minimizes civilian harms, and to carry out any
analysis subject to factors such as whether there is a reasonable
chance of mission success. Due to the circumstances and the
chances of initiating a nuclear apocalypse, this is as the very least
questionable.
Where RROE is utilized, however, where System 2 does not
identify grounds for refusing an order, System 3 would be
engaged. And, it is here that RROE offer the most focused
assessment when compared to either of the two extremes. For
example, as noted, an EAI applying Track 1 would only deny
manifestly unlawful orders. This is vital because, nuclear weapons
do not distinguish between combatant and civilian. Moreover, a
legitimate military target that was positioned close to a densely
populated urban area would mean that there would be a
considerable level of collateral damage (not to mention the
comprehensive costs of all out nuclear war).
With that in mind, it is arguable that a nuclear attack would
always be disproportionate in IHL terms. However, in providing
their Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the ICJ identified this may
not always be the case.192 Consequently, any “legitimate” order to
initiate a nuclear launch could be a lawful order, and if this was
the case in this scenario, the Track 1 analysis would not intercept.
In contrast (except, perhaps, where all other means and methods
192. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 29, ¶ 97. See also MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 6.17 (2004)
(“There is no specific rule of international law, express or implied, which prohibits the
use of nuclear weapons. The legality of their use depends upon the application of the
general rules of international law, including those regulating the use of force and the
conduct of hostilities”). “There are no rules of customary or conventional international
law prohibiting nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict. In the
absence of such an express prohibition, the use of nuclear weapons against enemy
combatants and other military objectives is not unlawful. Employment of nuclear
weapons is, however, subject to the following principles: the right of the parties to the
conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited; it is prohibited to launch
attacks against the civilian population as such; and distinction must be made at all times
between combatants and civilians to the effect that the latter be spared as much as
possible.” DEP’T OF THE NAVY ET AL., THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS § 10.2.1 (2007). See generally Practice Relating to Nuclear Weapons, IHL
DATABASE, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_nuwea
[https://perma.cc/8A27-DYKY] (last visited Dec. 22, 2020).
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had been attempted), it is difficult to imagine a set of
circumstances where an EAI operating on Track 3 would not
decide to intercept the same order, which contestably places too
great a weight upon the humanitarian end of the spectrum.
System 3, however, having considered the same set of
relevant legal provisions as the Track 1 system would move on to
consider the wider body of legal obligations. Importantly, this
would include all relevant ROE—including those relating
specifically to nuclear launch (which, given the weapon, are likely
to be extremely concise). Moreover, in the knowledge that a posthuman analysis of an order to initiate a nuclear launch was likely,
future ROE would include specific reference to the role in which
an EAI should play. Vitally, as identified in Scenario 3, these ROE
cannot be used to side-step existing international legal
obligations, but only to provide a greater detail of the strategic,
operational, and tactical methods of enforcing them.
If the order to launch a nuclear attack was a legitimate order,
there would be no reason for the EAI intercept it (though given
the circumstances, the engagement of system 4B(ii) might be the
more preferable outcome). As previously discussed, the case for
non-interception may be stronger the higher up the command
chain the EAI analysis is completed. However, where the EAI
examination took place at the level of the submarine
commander, and where communication was lost in the process of
receiving an “update” form strategic command, these ROE may
prove vital. No doubt the commander would also have some
access to these ROE, and would of course be a highly skilled, well
informed, individual.
Nevertheless, a commander cannot be expected to apply the
same legal acumen to a potentially voluminous set of instructions,
as would a New York Bar attorney. Moreover, they could not be
expected to do so at speeds anything like the data-processing
capabilities of a supercomputer—especially not when the same
individual’s entire training and preparation for events such as this
would have been succinctly grounded in the obligation to strictly
follow orders. If an EAI were instead tasked with analysing all
available data, including all relevant national doctrine, there
would be a much greater opportunity to identify whether the
order was consistent with matters of law, policy, and best practice,
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and the commander could be more confident that they were
making the right decision.
Importantly, however, if the EAI did not detect an
abnormality here, or indeed any other permitted reason to
intercept the order, the order must be followed. Nonetheless,
where there is reason to “suspect” an order was, for example,
overwritten, or that it was given with malicious intent, it could be
refused by the EAI. Prima facie, preventative refusal may seem the
most appropriate course of action here. However, it is arguable
whether states would employ such a system in a nuclear setting.
Instead, and perhaps in somewhat of a complete reversal, it is
proposed that passive refusal is the most appropriate “type” of
refusal for the following reasons. First, strategic decision making
will ultimately remain firmly in the hands of humans, but
secondly, by operating in such a way, the EAI might demonstrate
something akin to a “gut feeling”—a word of caution, as opposed
to an absolute rebuttal. Such a system would therefore assist a
commander instead of discounting their experience and rank.
V. WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOT REFUSAL
This penultimate Section extends this controversial
discussion into three further areas of analysis: the application of
“Robot Refusal” in the context of robot PMCs, spies, and more
provocatively, whether RROE should include insubordination for
EAIs. By way of brief caveat, the Authors do not intend to “close”
the discussion in each of these areas but rather, wish to open
these areas in the first instance for future discussion, and muchneeded debate. The specific PMC “angle” is whether, and to what
extent, an EAI PMC is perhaps more or less likely to disobey
orders compared with their human counterparts. It is relatively
uncontroversial to suggest that one of the primary motivating
factors for a human PMC partaking in a theatre of conflict will be
one of financial reward. Extending this argument a little further
may prompt the reasonable conclusion that PMCs (in light of this
“added value” or “financial incentive”) are less likely to refuse an
order. Indeed, should the PMC refuse or disobey an order, or at
the very least not successfully complete the mission, extra
enumerations may be affected. Meanwhile, an EAI PMC would
presumably not have that extra variable “present” (unless the EAI
is remunerated or motivated by Bitcoin or other crypto
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currencies). The Authors therefore conclude that the addition to
the “system of systems” presented above, combined with the
removal of the “mercenary” factor in the traditional sense, would
mean that there would be no reason as to why an EAI PMC would
feel less inclined to fail to disobey or refuse an illegal order.
The inclusion of spies within this discussion is to highlight
an instance whereby a “retired” combat EAI transitions from
SEAL Team 6 and begins employment at the “Agency”—a not
altogether uncommon career path. If the EAI spook mirrored
that particular human career choice, would the EAI still retain (in
the event it hadn’t undertaken a separate training at the “Farm”
in Langley, Virginia) its existing system of systems programming?
If this were to be the case, and the “hard drive” was not
“reformatted,” an order to target a dissident on London Bridge
with a poisoned tipped umbrella, would ultimately be rejected—
assuming of course that all EAIs were equally equipped with the
same system of systems set out in Part IV. As with the previous
inclusion of RROE in the PMC world, one could have a similar
instance whereby the variation in programming could result in
intelligence agents acting differently depending where they had
“undertaken” their initial training or programming.
Taken to its conclusion, were the EAI to wrongfully disobey
an order, should it face consequences for insubordination?
Clearly, and without being overly flippant (were one to apply such
a discussion to an AWS) the very simple answer would be to
reprogram the system. A less draconian approach may be some
form of disciplinary action but what that may look like in practice,
the Authors fully concede, is less tangible—loss of leave or pay is
unlikely to perhaps have a motivating factor. Clearly, there would
need to be a sliding scale, reflective of the increasing severity from
mere insubordination to full-on mutiny and/or treason.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, this Article has sought to bring to the forefront a
timely discussion regarding an EAI’s ability to refuse erroneous
orders—particularly in light of the fact that there is no agreed
position in terms of state practice or refusal of orders. The
Authors have proposed the novel inclusion of a test in order to
determine the precise limitations as to when and how this should
happen. Therefore, the proposed RROE not only offer greater
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clarity for now, but something distinctly concrete for the future.
Whereas more traditional lines of thinking have rightly cautioned
against an AWS or EAI’s ability to compute human emotions
when making proportionality assessments, the Authors’ novel
approach has been to reverse the thinking and suggest that the
EAI is not only placed to understand human traits but can also
override human error.
Such action might be considered necessary in any number of
scenarios. For example, where a human combatant has complied
with their IHL requirements, but where factors such as selfpreservation or instinct have clouded their “human ability” to
objectively make
proportionality assessments. In such an
instance, the Authors recommend aborting launch. In making a
decision as to whether to obey or disobey human error, the EAI
should not only calculate the IHL “requirements” but also
actively look to discount any “human factors” which may have
influenced the decision. When it comes to an EAI responding to
an EAI error, the Authors envisaged EAI/AI “checks,” carried out
by a number of different systems in order to add an additional
level of protection in order to identify and prevent rogue orders.
In the very purest strategic sense this would indeed be the
ultimate “system of systems.”
Part II of the Article was the natural starting point for the
discussion and revisited the key tenets of IHL in order to provide
a logical interface between a combatant’s obligations under DTP
and the right of refusal considered in Part III. As noted in Parts I
and II which, forms part of the key concluding message once
states are equipped with EAI, IHL may well compel their usage.
Part III of the Article extended the discussion into differing
thresholds for the refusal of orders. Here, the Authors
summarized that the minimum standard as portrayed in the
narrow obligation requires a member of the armed forces to
strictly adhere to an order unless there is a customary duty to
refuse on the grounds that it is manifestly unlawful. Perhaps
somewhat unfortunately, the analysis identified that difficulties
may arise when programming EAI to refuse, due to the fact the
obligation operates more broadly. For some states, it is not a
straightforward consideration as to the lawfulness of the order.
Instead, a combatant adhering to the wider obligation must
reconcile any order according to relatively abstract concepts such
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as human dignity, while concurrently scrutinizing whether or not
there is a reasonable chance of mission success, or whether the
order is consistent with national policy. This leads to the
eventuality, however, that existing practice is not only
incongruous, but can also place too great an emphasis upon
either military necessity or humanitarian considerations—both of
which are elements that IHL, at its heart, strives to balance
without bias.
Part IV of the Article provided what the Authors believe is a
robust legal “system of systems” not just with the intended effect
of ensuring appropriate compliance or non-compliance from a
legal perspective, but one that one would have strategic benefit
too. It is perhaps overly tempting to suggest that Clausewitz’s idea
of “total war” (where the “gloves come off”) is necessarily the
appropriate strategic approach—the system envisaged by the
Authors not only limits unlawful actions but ones which would
also minimize and reduce strategic error as well.
In Part V the Authors broadened the remit of the discussion
and extended the discussion into a natural EAI career trajectory:
PMC and espionage. Here the Authors note that the existence of
EAI may well cause the gradual extinction of PMCs or at least in
the sense of them operating as mercenaries. More problematic
perhaps in both the realms of PMC and espionage is the “legacy”
programming—the EAI’s original training and embedding of
system of systems may prove ideal for IHL compliance but prevent
ineffectual operational qualities. Quite simply, the system of
systems programming may be too effective, and an EAI would
refuse any of the “Black Ops” missions those realms frequent.193
Too simplistic and broad a rebuttal to any such
considerations undertaken in this work would be to simply
dismiss such a discussion in the realms of “well . . . it depends on
the algorithm.” What this Article has pinpointed and strived to
comprehend, is precisely what such calculations would look like.
193. A final “footnote” to this discussion more generally, surrounding future use
of PMCs is that their role may decrease rather than increase. While it is undeniable that
the immediate future will see an ever-increasing presence of PMCs both in combat (and
even more so in non-combat roles), the Authors contend that a natural re-shaping of the
sector will occur. The very raison d’être of a PMC is financial reward as opposed to
fighting for the flag—when such reward is no longer conceivable (in the future envisaged
by the Authors) the existence of PMCs may continue, but they would no longer be
mercenaries.
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In terms of an AWS system it might be a continuous
proportionality feedback assessment. In terms of EAI, in addition
to the ongoing proportionality assessment, it is a series of
additional checks and balances both to discount human error
and emotion, and, indeed, to ensure an even greater level of
compliance with IHL obligations. Clearly, this raised broader
issues in terms of chain of command where the Authors
questioned whether an EAI should be able to override a chain of
command and concluded in the affirmative.
To return to one example from the civilian “field”
highlighted in the abstract—an aircraft’s anti stall mechanism’s
potential to override human error—such overriding is seen as
nothing but a positive.194 It is also perhaps important to
distinguish that the system of systems proposed here is much
stricter par excellence than say, an automotive vehicle’s system of
systems—the car is unlikely to shut down and switch off (thus
overriding its human controller) purely because they have
ignored the wrench key, designating that the vehicle is in need of
service or the coffee cup icon denoting the need for a break. In
complete contrast, an EAI could, would, and should abort a
nuclear launch if there are any “red flags” raised by the system of
systems. The Authors believe that starting and opening this muchneeded dialogue for further debate will assist in the growth of
scholarship in this area. It is the firm assertion of the Authors that
under certain circumstances, “robot refusal” is preferable to
unquestioning acceptance of human error.

194. See supra note 15.
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